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ABSTRACT
APPLYING MOBILE AGENTS
IN AN IMMUNE-SYSTEM-BASED
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
Nearly all present-day commercial intrusion detection systems are based on a
hierarchical architecture. In such an architecture, the root node is responsible for
detecting intrusions and for issuing responses. However, an intrusion detection system
(IDS) based on a hierarchical architecture has many single points of failure. For
example, by disabling the root node, the intrusion-detection function of the IDS will
also be disabled.
To solve this problem, an IDS inspired by the human immune system is proposed. The
proposed IDS has no single component that is responsible for detecting intrusions.
Instead, the intrusion-detection function is divided and placed within mobile agents.
Mobile agents act similarly to white blood cells of the human immune system and travel
from host to host in the network to detect intrusions. The IDS is fault-tolerant because it
can continue to detect intrusions even when most of its components have been disabled.
Key terms:
Computer security; intrusion detection system; immune system; mobile agent; fault-
tolerance; anomaly detection; system call monitoring; computer immunology.
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  CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Intrusion detection systems
A computer system's security mechanisms should prevent unauthorized access to its
resources and data. However, it is impossible to build a completely secure system for
many different reasons: programs and operating systems have vulnerabilities, firewalls
can be circumvented, passwords can be cracked, and a system can be abused by insiders
(Sundaram, 1996). Moreover, the increasing connectivity of computer systems gives
greater access to outsiders and makes it easier for intruders to avoid identification
(Mukherjee, Heberlein & Levitt, 1994).
Unless there is a mechanism that will detect breaches of the system's security, we may
be unaware that the computer system has been attacked. Intrusion detection provides
such a mechanism and is defined as "the problem of identifying individuals who are
using a computer system without authorization (i.e. 'crackers') and those who have
legitimate access to the system but are abusing their privileges (i.e. the 'insider threat')"
(Mukherjee, Heberlein & Levitt, 1994). A computer system that provides this function
is called an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
1.2 Problem statement
Nearly all present-day commercial intrusion detection systems (IDSs) follow a
hierarchical architecture (Jansen, 2002; Jansen et al. 2000; Jansen et al. 1999).
Hierarchical architectures are used because they are excellent for creating scalable
distributed IDSs with central points of administration. However, an IDS based on a
hierarchical architecture has many single points of failure if it has no redundant
communication lines or the capability to dynamically reconfigure relationships in the
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case of failure of key components. For example, an attacker may interrupt the operation
of the entire IDS by successfully disabling the system's root node. Since the root node is
responsible for the actual function of detecting intrusions and for issuing responses,
disabling it will not allow the IDS to detect intrusions (this is further explained in
Section 2.5.2). Therefore, a hierarchical architecture does not facilitate the building of
robust and fault-tolerant IDSs.
An intruder who knows that an IDS is used may want to disable it, thereby allowing the
intruder to attack the rest of the computer system undetected. The critical role played by
the root node of the IDS makes it a likely target of attack. Although such critical
components usually reside on platforms that have been hardened to resist direct attack,
the IDS may still be vulnerable as other survivability techniques such as redundancy,
mobility, or dynamic recovery are lacking in current implementations. A system could
also employ redundant components for each key node to avoid this problem. However,
such a solution does not offer much fault-tolerance because a determined and
knowledgeable attacker can disable a small number of backups.
From the above discussion, it is clear that there exists a need to improve the described
hierarchical architecture in order to create a more robust and fault-tolerant IDS.
Therefore, in this dissertation, the following question will be investigated:
Can an IDS architecture be proposed such that it will offer greater fault-tolerance
and consequently overcome the described limitation (i.e. vulnerability to direct
attack) of current hierarchical IDS architectures that nearly all present-day
commercial IDSs use?
1.3 Solution approach
To solve the stated problem, we propose an IDS inspired by the human immune system.
The human immune system has many properties that not only allow it to effectively
detect and eliminate intrusions (such as bacteria) in the body, but they also provide
fault-tolerance in the system. The immune system can remain functional even when
many of its components have failed. When certain properties of the human immune
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system are applied to intrusion detection, the result is an IDS that also provides fault-
tolerance.
As in the immune system, the proposed IDS uses small, independent, and disposable
intrusion detectors. The role of the intrusion detectors is played by mobile agents, which
travel from host to host in the network to detect possible intrusions. When mobile
agents are applied in an IDS based on the immune system, the result is an IDS that is
made more resistant to failure because it can remain operational even when most of its
components have been disabled.
Several approaches for building computer security architectures that incorporate
principles of the human immune system have been proposed by Somayaji, Hofmeyr and
Forrest (1997). One approach suggested was to implement the adaptive immune system
layer by kernel-assisted lymphocyte processes, or mobile agents, that can migrate
between computers. With help from the kernel, the lymphocyte processes are able to
query other processes to determine if they are functioning normally. Nevertheless, the
authors did not provide further details about this particular suggested approach. We
used this suggestion in our earlier work (Zielinski & Venter, 2004) and proposed an IDS
based on certain properties of the human immune system. In this dissertation, the
proposed IDS is discussed in much greater detail.
1.4 Scope of this research
The discussion of the proposed IDS is limited to only a theoretical description of the
system in terms of its main components and how it should function if it were
implemented. In addition, the proposed IDS is described only in terms of its intrusion-
detection function. The intrusion-response function of the IDS is not considered in this
work.
This dissertation also does not discuss aspects of the proposed IDS that depend on a
particular operating system under which the IDS will run, or which depend on how the
IDS is implemented. The motivation for this choice is that, by not considering
implementation issues when proposing the IDS, the applicability of the proposed IDS is
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not restricted to only certain environments. That is, it also allows the implementers to
address implementation issues in a way that is optimal for a particular environment,
rather than being restricted to using aspects of the system that are optimal for only a
certain environment. This dissertation does, however, discuss some of the most
significant issues that should be considered when implementing the proposed IDS.
Furthermore, because this research is a conceptual study of how mobile agents can be
applied in an immune-system-based IDS, the proposed IDS has not been tested by, for
example, creating a prototype of the system.
1.5 Organization of chapters
This dissertation is organized as follows:
- Chapter 1 is a brief introduction.
- Chapter 2 provides a discussion of intrusion detection systems. Topics discussed
include: the need for IDSs, how IDSs are classified, different approaches to
intrusion detection, different IDS architectures, desirable properties of IDSs, as well
as the current shortcomings of IDSs.
- Chapter 3 provides background information to mobile agents. Topics discussed
include: the components of a mobile agent system, agent behaviour, advantages and
disadvantages of applying mobile agents to intrusion detection, as well as security
issues of mobile agents.
- Chapter 4 briefly discusses the human immune system and the properties that enable
it to effectively detect intruders (such as bacteria) in the body.
- Chapter 5 discusses the proposed IDS. This chapter also contains a discussion of
how concepts of the human immune system have been applied in the proposed IDS
and how the proposed IDS is similar to the human immune system.
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- Chapter 6 evaluates the proposed IDS in terms of how it solves the research
problem, as well as the system's benefits and drawbacks. Some of the most
significant issues that will need to be considered when implementing the IDS are
also discussed.
- Chapter 7 contains concluding remarks as well as recommendations for further
research.
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  CHAPTER 2 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
2.1 Introduction
An intrusion is an event, or a set of events, that attempts to compromise a computer
system's confidentiality, integrity, availability, or that attempts to bypass its security
mechanisms. Intrusions can be caused by system insiders or by external attackers.
System insiders, or users authorized to use the system, can cause intrusions by
attempting to gain privileges to which they are not entitled or by misusing the privileges
that have been given to them. External attackers, or users who have not been authorized
to use the system, can cause intrusions by gaining access to the system from outside,
such as the internet (Bace & Mell, 2001).
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an automated system that aims to detect
intrusions in a computer system. The main goal of an IDS is to detect any unauthorized
use, abuse, or misuse of computer systems by both system insiders and external
attackers (Mukherjee, Heberlein & Levitt, 1994). Its purpose can be compared to that of
a car alarm, which alerts its owner when the car has been broken into. Once an intrusion
has been detected, the IDS typically issues an intrusion-response action, which may
range from reporting the intrusion to the system administrator, to taking some action
against the intruder.
In this chapter, a detailed discussion of intrusion detection systems is presented. This
chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lists the reasons why intrusion detection
systems are necessary. This is followed by Section 2.3, which contains a classification
of the different types of IDSs together with their advantages and disadvantages. Section
2.4 discusses the different components of a typical IDS. Organizing the components in
different ways results in different IDS architectures, which are discussed in Section 2.5.
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This is followed by a discussion of the desirable characteristics of an IDS in Section 2.6
and the current shortcomings of IDSs in Section 2.7. This chapter is concluded in
Section 2.8.
2.2 Why are intrusion detection systems necessary?
Increased network connectivity of computer systems gives greater access to outsiders
and makes it easier for intruders to avoid identification (Mukherjee, Heberlein & Levitt,
1994). By being connected to the internet, computer systems are exposed to different
threats and are made more vulnerable to different attacks. By using an IDS, an attack on
the computer system can be detected and measures can be taken to stop it before any
damage is done to the computer system.
There are several reasons why IDSs are necessary (Bace & Mell, 2001):
- To serve as a means to deter those who would violate security policy. This assumes
that an increased perceived risk of discovery and prosecution of attackers can
prevent certain security problems. That is, an attacker may be deterred from, for
example, gaining unauthorized access to the system due to the possibility of being
discovered and prosecuted.
- To detect attacks and other security violations that other security measures cannot
prevent. An IDS can be used to detect attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the
security mechanisms of a computer system. In addition, an IDS can serve an
important function in protecting the system because it can report intrusions to
system administrators, who can contain and recover any resulting damage.
- To detect preambles of attacks. The first stage of an attack usually involves
examining a system or network for any vulnerabilities, searching for an optimal
point of entry. This stage is often experienced as network probes and other tests for
existing vulnerabilities. By using an IDS, the probes can be detected and action may
be taken to block the attacker's access to the target system.
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- To document the existing system threat. An understanding of the frequency and
characteristics of attacks allows understanding of what security measures are
appropriate to protect the system.
- To act as a means of quality control for security design and administration. An IDS
that runs over a period of time can show patterns of system usage and detected
problems. These can show the design and management flaws in the system's
security. Deficiencies can be corrected before they cause a security problem.
- To provide information about actual intrusions. An IDS can collect relevant and
detailed information about the attack, which supports incident handling and
recovery efforts. Such information can also be used to identify problem areas in the
security configuration or policy of the system.
2.3 Classification of intrusion detection systems
Intrusion detection systems can be classified according to:
1. The source of data used for analysis
2. The intrusion detection model used by the IDS
3. The distribution of the IDS components
2.3.1 The source of data used for analysis
An IDS requires specific types of data that it can analyse for possible intrusions. The
data is obtained from different sources, depending on what types of attacks should be
detected by the IDS. With respect to the source of data used for analysis, intrusion
detection systems are classified as host-based or network-based (Mukherjee, Heberlein
& Levitt, 1994).
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2.3.1.1 Host-based IDSs
A host-based IDS operates at the host level, collecting information from within an
individual computer system (Bace & Mell, 2001). This allows a host-based IDS to
analyse activities with high precision and reliability; it can determine exactly which
processes and users are involved in a particular attack on the operating system. A host-
based IDS also has the ability to directly access and monitor the data files and system
processes usually targeted by attacks. Therefore, it can view the system after an
attempted attack, which allows it to verify the success or failure of an attack.
A host-based IDS normally uses information sources of two types: operating system
audit logs and system logs (Bace, 2000). Operating system audit logs are records of
system events, generated at the innermost (kernel) level of the operating system. System
logs, on the other hand, are files of system and application events.
An audit log can reveal system events at a finer-grained level of detail than system logs.
However, this makes audit logs larger and more complex to understand than system
logs. System logs are also considered less trustworthy than operating system audit logs.
This is because the log-generation program is usually running as an application, which
makes it easier to subvert or otherwise modify than the audit subsystem. In addition,
because the system logs are usually stored in unprotected directories on the system, it is
easy for an attacker to locate and modify or destroy the files in an effort to remove
evidence of an attack.
A special subset of host-based IDSs are application-based IDSs, which analyse the
events that occur within a software application. An application's transaction log files
typically serve as the data source for this subset of host-based IDSs.
Application-based IDSs have the ability to interface with the application directly, with
significant domain or application-specific knowledge included in the analysis engine.
This allows detection of suspicious behaviour due to authorized users exceeding their
authorization.
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2.3.1.2 Network-based IDSs
A network-based IDS uses raw network packets as its data source. The network packets
are obtained from a network adapter running in promiscuous mode (a mode during
which all the frames that pass over the network are picked up; not just those destined for
the node served by the card). Early IDSs were host-based, but present systems are
usually network-based. Although most network-based IDSs build their detection
mechanism on monitored network traffic, some also use host audit logs (Mukherjee,
Heberlein & Levitt, 1994).
A network-based IDS often has several single-purpose sensors or hosts placed at
various points in a network. These units monitor network traffic by performing local
analysis of that traffic and report attacks to a central management console (Bace &
Mell, 2001). Since a network-based IDS can monitor the network traffic as an attack is
occurring, it is more difficult for an attacker to remove evidence of attacks than in a
host-based IDS.
2.3.1.3 Comparison of host- and network-based IDSs
Host- and network-based IDSs have different strengths and weaknesses resulting from
the source of data used for analysis and the environment in which they operate (ISS,
1998; Bace & Mell, 2001).
Due to the different sources of data used for analysis, a host-based IDS can detect
intrusions that a network-based IDS will miss, and vice versa. For example, an attack
from the keyboard of a critical server cannot be seen by a network-based IDS as no data
passes the network, but this could be detected by a host-based IDS. On the other hand,
many IP-based denial-of-service and fragmented packet attacks can only be detected by
examining packet headers as they travel across a network. Since a host-based IDS
cannot examine all packet headers, it cannot detect these types of attacks, which can be
detected by a network-based IDS.
A network-based IDS monitors network traffic in a way that is transparent to the users
of the network. Therefore, the likelihood than an attacker will be able to locate the
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network monitor and disable it without significant effort is decreased. In contrast, a
host-based IDS may be attacked and disabled as part of an attack on the host on which
the IDS is located.
The source of data used for analysis also affects the ability of the IDS to verify success
or failure of an attack. In particular, a host-based IDS can determine whether an attack
was successful, with greater accuracy and fewer false positives than a network-based
system. This arises from the fact that a host-based IDS uses logs that contain events that
have actually occurred. A network-based IDS can only determine that an attack was
initiated, but it cannot determine whether it was successful. This implies that, after a
network-based IDS has detected an attack, administrators must manually investigate
each attacked host to determine whether it was attacked.
The detection capability of an IDS is also affected by the environment in which an IDS
is used. In particular, the use of encryption of network traffic and the use of switches in
a network may limit the detection capability of a network-based IDS.
A network-based IDS cannot analyse encrypted packets, depending on where the
encryption resides within the protocol stack. Therefore, a network-based IDS will not
detect certain attacks, which could be detected by a host-based IDS if the incoming data
stream has been decrypted at the operating system level.
Switches allow large networks to be managed as many smaller network segments, and
provide dedicated links between hosts serviced by the same switch. This may present
difficulties in choosing the best locations for deploying a network-based IDS to achieve
sufficient network coverage. Although traffic-mirroring and administrative ports on
switches can help, these techniques are not always appropriate. A host-based IDS has
greater visibility in a switched environment because it can reside on as many critical
hosts as is required.
Furthermore, a host-based IDS resides on the host that it monitors. Therefore, although
no additional hardware is required, a host-based IDS uses the resources of the
monitored host, affecting the host's performance.
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A network-based IDS, on the other hand, usually only examines network traffic without
interfering with the normal operation of the network. However, a network-based IDS
may have difficulty in processing all packets in a network with high volumes of traffic.
The inability to process packets quickly enough may result in some packets being
dropped. Therefore, the IDS may fail to recognize an attack launched during periods of
high traffic volume. Some vendors are attempting to solve this problem by
implementing the IDS completely in hardware, which will result in faster packet
processing. Other vendors attempt to solve this problem by trying to detect fewer
attacks and to also detect attacks with as little computing resources as possible, which
may reduce the overall effectiveness of the IDS.
Once the required data has been obtained, it is analysed for possible intrusions. The way
in which the collected data is analysed is determined by the intrusion detection model
used by the IDS.
2.3.2 The intrusion detection model used by the IDS
With respect to the model of intrusion detection, intrusion detection systems are
classified according to what analysis technique is used to detect intrusions. IDSs mainly
use two techniques: anomaly detection and misuse detection (Bace, 2000; Bace & Mell,
2001). It is also possible to use a combination of both anomaly and misuse detection
techniques (Botha, 2004; Anderson, Frivold & Valdes, 1995).
2.3.2.1 IDSs based on anomaly detection
An IDS that employs anomaly detection first creates a profile of normal system or user
behaviour, during which no intrusion takes place. Once the profile has been created, the
IDS analyses the current behaviour of the system with the behaviour recorded earlier. It
is assumed that any intrusive actions will result in behaviour that is different from
behaviour that is normally seen in the system. Any significant deviations from the
normal behaviour are treated as intrusive behaviour.
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The allowable deviation from the normal behaviour is defined as a threshold set by the
specific detection method used or by the system security administrator. Selecting an
appropriate threshold level is critical for the proper detection of intrusions. If the
allowable deviation from the normal behaviour is small, then many anomalous activities
that are not intrusive will be misdiagnosed as being intrusive. That is, the false positive
(false alarm) rate will be high. On the other hand, if the allowable deviation from the
normal behaviour is large, then some intrusive activities may not be recognized as being
sufficiently anomalous for the IDS to treat them as intrusions. This results in a false
negative, because the IDS falsely reports that no attack has occurred (Sundaram, 1996).
An IDS based on anomaly detection can detect attacks that the IDS has not seen before.
Therefore, unlike IDSs based on misuse detection, it does not need to be updated with
new attack signatures when new attacks are devised.
IDSs based on anomaly detection usually have a high false positive rate. This results
from the fact that users and systems often exhibit legitimate but previously unseen
behaviour. The previously unseen behaviour is different from that which is considered
as normal by the IDS and is therefore treated as anomalous and as a possible intrusion.
In addition, anomaly detection approaches often require extensive "training sets" of
system event records to allow them to characterize normal behaviour patterns.
2.3.2.2 IDSs based on misuse detection
An IDS that employs misuse detection is based on searching for attack signatures in the
behaviour of the system and its users. An attack signature is a known attack method that
is known to exploit system vulnerabilities and cause security problems.
Misuse detection is very effective at detecting known attacks, which leads to a low
number of false alarms. Moreover, because known attacks can be detected, misuse
detection can reliably diagnose the use of a specific attack tool or technique. Therefore,
system administrators, regardless of their level of security expertise, can track security
problems on their systems and can initiate appropriate incident handling procedures to
deal with the specific attack (Bace & Mell, 2001).
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An IDS that employs misuse detection cannot detect previously unseen attacks because
it only knows how to detect those attacks for which signatures have been defined.
Therefore, when new attacks are devised, the IDS must be updated with new attack
signatures. In addition, if an attack signature is too specific for a particular attack
method, then the IDS will not be able to use that signature to detect variants of that
attack method.
2.3.2.3 Anomaly detection approaches
Biermann, Cloete and Venter (2001) identify the following approaches to anomaly
detection:
Statistical approach
In this approach, the normal, or expected, behaviour is defined by collecting data
relating to the behaviour of legitimate users over a period of time. Statistical tests are
then applied to the observed behaviour to determine the legitimacy of the behaviour.
The current behaviour and the original learnt behaviour may be merged at intervals,
which allows the IDS to adaptively learn the behaviour of users. However, it also allows
the IDS to be gradually "trained" by intruders to recognize intrusive events as normal
behaviour (Sundaram, 1996).
Predictive pattern generation
In this approach, future events are predicted based on events that have already occurred.
The IDS generates rules that define the probability that a certain event will occur. A rule
consists of a left-hand side and a right-hand side. The left-hand side defines two
concurrent events, while the right-hand side provides the probability of a specific event
following the events defined on the left-hand side. If the left-hand side of a rule is
matched, but the right-hand side statistically deviates from the prediction, then the event
is treated as intrusive.
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This approach has several benefits (Sundaram, 1996). Firstly, anomalous activities that
were difficult to detect with traditional methods can be detected using rule-based
sequential patterns. Secondly, systems based on this model are highly adaptive to
changes, while also making it easier to detect users who try to "train" the system during
its learning period to recognize anomalous behaviour. Lastly, this approach allows
anomalous activities to be detected and reported within seconds of receiving audit
events.
Neural networks
Neural networks use adaptive learning techniques for characterization of anomalous
behaviour. This approach operates on historical sets of training data. These sets of
training data should not have any data that indicate intrusions or other undesirable user
behaviour (Bace, 2000).
A neural network consists of numerous simple processing elements called units that
interact by using weighted connections. The knowledge of a neural network is
represented in the structure of the network, in terms of the connections between
different units and their weights. The actual learning process takes place by adding and
removing connections and by changing weights.
Neural network processing has two stages. During the first stage, the network is
populated by using a training set of historical or other sample data that represents user
behaviour. During the second stage, the neural network accepts event data and compares
it to historical behaviour references to determine similarities and differences.
The neural network indicates that an event is abnormal by changing the state of the
units, by changing the weights of connections and by adding or removing connections.
Stepwise corrections are also performed by the network to modify the definition of what
constitutes a normal event.
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Sequence matching and learning
This approach, introduced by Lane and Brodley (1997), applies machine learning to
anomaly detection. An IDS that uses this approach is based on the assumption that a
user responds in a predictable manner to similar situations, which leads to repeated
sequences of actions. The characteristic sequences of actions generated by users can be
learnt to create a user profile. The differences in characteristic sequences are used to
distinguish a valid user from an intruder masquerading as that specific user.
2.3.2.4 Misuse detection approaches
Approaches to misuse detection include the following (Biermann, Cloete & Venter,
2001):
Expert systems
In this approach, past intrusions, known system vulnerabilities and the security policy
are encoded as rules. As information is gathered during operation of the IDS, the expert
system determines whether any rules have been satisfied (Frank, 1994).
Keystroke monitoring
This approach monitors keystrokes for attack patterns. As this method does not analyse
the running of a program, but only the keystrokes, a malicious program cannot be
flagged for intrusive activities (Sundaram, 1996).
Model-based
Model-based approaches are based on modelling known intrusion attempts as sequences
of user behaviour. The behaviours are then modelled as events in an audit trail. To
detect intrusions, the IDS determines how the identified user behaviour is manifested in
an audit trail.
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State transition analysis
In this approach, a state transition diagram is used to graphically represent the actions
performed by an intruder to compromise a system. An intrusion is viewed as a sequence
of actions performed by an intruder that lead from some initial state on a computer
system to a target compromised state. State transition analysis diagrams identify the
requirements and the compromise of the penetration. They also show the essential
actions that need to occur for an intrusion to be successfully completed.
Pattern matching
The pattern matching approach is based on encoding known intrusion signatures as
patterns that are matched against the audit data. An IDS based on pattern matching
attempts to match incoming events to the patterns that represent intrusion scenarios. An
event consists of monitored changes in the state of the system, or part of the system. It
can also represent a single action by a specific user, an action by the system, or a series
of actions resulting in a single, observable record.
The intrusion detection model, or the data analysis technique, used by an IDS to detect
intrusions, is implemented at one or more locations in the computer system. The number
of the locations at which data is analysed is determined by the way in which the IDS
components are distributed.
2.3.3 The distribution of the IDS components
With respect to component distribution, intrusion detection systems are classified
according to the way in which their components are distributed. Spafford and Zamboni
(2000) identify two such classes: centralized and distributed intrusion detection systems.
A centralized IDS analyses its data at a fixed number of locations. These locations are
independent of the number of hosts being monitored. A distributed IDS analyses its data
at a number of locations proportional to the number of hosts that are being monitored.
In this classification, only the locations and the number of the data analysis components
are considered; the data collection components are not considered.
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A centralized IDS does not scale well. It only has a fixed number of analysis
components. Therefore, if the number of monitored hosts increases, then the analysis
components will need more computing and storage resources to support the load. A
distributed IDS, on the other hand, can add components as needed, making it easier to
scale to a large number of hosts. However, scalability of a distributed IDS can be
limited by the need to communicate between the components and by the need for central
co-ordinating components.
A centralized IDS typically has fewer analysis components than a distributed IDS. This
makes a centralized IDS easier to configure globally, but it may be difficult to adjust for
specific characteristics of the different hosts being monitored. The smaller number of
analysis components in a centralized IDS also implies that the analysis information is
located in fewer locations, which allows for easier detection of changes in global
behaviour. A distributed IDS has its analysis information distributed, which may make
it more difficult to adjust to global changes in behaviour, although local changes are
easier to detect.
2.4 Components of an IDS
The Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) defines several components that
are found in any IDS. The different components are discussed below (CIDF, 1999;
Lundin & Jonsson, 2002).
2.4.1 Event generators
Also known as "E-boxes", event generators serve as the data collection components of
an IDS. They collect data about the events they are specialized to notice. The type of
event data collected depends on what type of attacks the IDS must be able to recognize.
They can also perform some pre-processing of data, for example to transform data to a
common format, or to make a preliminary filtering of the data.
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2.4.2 Event databases
Event databases, or "D-boxes", store information produced by the event generators and
analysis engines for later use. An example of an event database is a database that stores
system log data.
2.4.3 Analysis engines
Analysis engines, or "A-boxes", implement the detection algorithm. They analyse the
data that is stored in the event databases, which has been collected by the event
generators.
Analysis engines also make use of two other databases: the detection policy database
and the state information database (Lundin & Jonsson, 2002). The detection policy
database contains pre-programmed information about how to detect intrusions, such as
the different intrusion signatures and thresholds. The state information database is used
to store dynamic information for detection, such as state information about partially
fulfilled intrusion signatures and other information about current behaviour in the
system.
2.4.4 Response units
Information about events that have been classified as anomalous or intrusive by the
analysis engines is sent to the response units. Response units, or "R-boxes", decide how
to respond to different events, based on pre-programmed rules in the response policy
database. Different parameters, such as the certainty connected to the event and the
potential impact of the event, affect what response action will be taken.
The type of response taken can be classified as active or passive (Bace, 2000). Active
responses involve taking an action after the detection of an intrusion. Examples of such
actions include changing the data collection configuration or the detection policy to
collect more information about an event in progress, changing the environment, or
taking some action against the intruder. Passive responses, on the other hand, do not
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take any action other than to report and record the intrusion. This approach assumes that
the user of the IDS will be able to take the necessary action to respond to a detected
intrusion.
An outline of a generic IDS is shown in Figure 2.1 (based on Lundin and Jonsson,
2002).
Figure 2.1 Components of a generic IDS (based on Lundin and Jonsson (2002): figure 1)
These components may be organized in different ways, resulting in different IDS
architectures. These architectures are discussed in the next section.
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2.5 IDS architectures
The discussion in this section is based on the work of Jansen (2002), Jansen et al.
(2000) and Jansen et al. (1999).  Therefore, references to these sources will be omitted
in this section.
2.5.1 Early IDS architectures
The first generation of intrusion detection systems followed an architecture that only
had two logical components: the data collection component and the analysis component.
The data collection component obtains information from either audit logs and internal
interfaces at the host (Lunt & Jagannathan, 1988; Sebring et al., 1988; Smaha, 1988) or
from monitoring packets on attached networks (Heberlein et al., 1990). The information
is then passed to a centralized analysis component that analyses it for intrusions. Such
an architecture is shown in Figure 2.2. The two logical components may be located
either on a single host or on separate hosts.
Figure 2.2 Two-component architecture of an IDS
This type of architecture is effective for small collections of monitored hosts. However,
the centralized analysis limits the system's scalability: as more collection components
are added, the single analysis component must analyse more information. Later
generations of IDSs provide scalability by introducing intermediate components
between the collection and analysis components to form a hierarchy. These components
pre-process and combine collected information into input for analysis.
Analysis component
Data collection component
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2.5.2 Hierarchical IDS architectures
Nearly all present-day commercial intrusion detection systems follow a hierarchical
architecture (Jansen, 2002). Hierarchical architectures are used because they are
excellent for creating scalable distributed IDSs with central points of administration.
Such an architecture follows a tree structure as shown in Figure 2.3. Individual nodes
within a network are shown with circles and the information flows between different
types of nodes are shown with arrows.
Figure 2.3 Hierarchical architecture of an IDS
The leaf nodes represent network-based or host-based collection points at which
information is gathered. The event information is passed to internal nodes, which
aggregate information from multiple leaf nodes. Further aggregation, abstraction and
data reduction occur at higher internal nodes until the root node is reached. The root
node is a command and control system that is responsible for detecting intrusions and
for issuing responses. Typically, the root node also reports to an operator console where
an administrator can manually assess status and issue commands to the IDS.
Hierarchical architectures generally provide efficient communication, whereby refined
information filters upward in the hierarchy and control downward. Although such an
architecture is excellent for creating scalable distributed IDSs with central points of
Command and control node
Aggregation nodes
Data collection nodes
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administration, it is rather rigid because of the tight binding between functionality and
lines of communication that tend to evolve.
Reliance on hierarchical structures for components makes the IDS vulnerable to direct
attack. Many single points of failure exist in an IDS that has no redundant
communication lines or the capability to dynamically reconfigure relationships in the
case of failure of key components. For example, an attacker may interrupt the operation
of the entire IDS by successfully disabling the root node. Since the root node is
responsible for detecting intrusions and for issuing responses, disabling it will not allow
the IDS to detect intrusions.
An intruder who knows that an IDS is used may want to disable it. By disabling the
IDS, the intruder can attack the rest of the computer system undetected. Therefore, the
critical role played by the central controller makes it a likely target of attack. Although
such critical components usually reside on platforms that have been hardened to resist
direct attack, the IDS may still be vulnerable as other survivability techniques such as
redundancy, mobility, or dynamic recovery are lacking in current implementations. A
system could also employ redundant components for each key node to avoid this
problem. However, such a solution does not offer much fault-tolerance because a
determined and knowledgeable attacker can disable a small number of backups.
2.5.3 Network IDS architectures
In contrast to a hierarchical IDS architecture, network IDS architectures allow
information to flow from any node to any other node. Network architectures tend to be
inefficient in communication because of the unconstrained communication flow. This is
compensated for with their flexibility to function.
This type of architecture is used by Cooperating Security Managers (White, Fisch &
Pooch, 1996). The data collection, aggregation, as well as the command and control
functions are consolidated into a single component located on every monitored system.
Any significant events that occur at one system that stem from a connection originating
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at another are reported to the system manager of the originating system. This reporting
is performed by the security manger at the system where the event occurred.
Although the components of such an IDS implicitly tend toward a hierarchy, the
tendency is not strict, since communication can occur between any type of components
and not strictly on a one-to-one or master / slave basis. For example, a data collection
unit could directly notify the command and control unit of a critical event, rather than
through an aggregation node.
2.5.4 Hybrid IDS architectures
A hybrid IDS architecture is a combination of both hierarchical and network IDS
architectures. It has an overall hierarchical architecture, although it has no distinct root
node. It also follows a network architecture by allowing its components to communicate
outside the strict hierarchy when useful. An example of such an architecture is shown in
Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 Hybrid architecture of an IDS
The architecture in Figure 2.4 shows a peer relationship between the command and
control nodes. It also shows direct communication between a data collection node and a
command and control node. This type of communication may be useful to communicate
Command and control nodes
Aggregation nodes
Data collection nodes
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an important or critical event. There is also a redundant communication link, for fault-
tolerance, between a command and control node and an aggregation node.
2.6 Desirable characteristics of an IDS
There are several characteristics that are desirable in an IDS. Jansen et al. (1999) have
divided these characteristics into two groups of requirements: functional requirements
and performance requirements.
2.6.1 Functional requirements
The common functional requirements of intrusion detection system include the
following:
- The IDS must continually monitor and report intrusions.
- When an intrusion occurs, the IDS must supply enough information to determine the
extent of the damage, establish responsibility for the intrusion, and allow the system
to be repaired.
- As each host and network segment will require their own tests, and these tests will
need to be continuously upgraded (and eventually replaced with new tests), the IDS
should be modular and configurable.
- The IDS should be easily and frequently updated with new attack signatures as new
security advisories and security patches become available and as new vulnerabilities
and attacks are discovered.
- The IDS itself is a primary target of attack because of its assigned critical role of
monitoring the security state of the network. Therefore, the IDS should exhibit a
high degree of fault-tolerance and should provide graceful degradation to enable it
to operate in a hostile environment.
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- The IDS should adapt to changes in network topology and configuration as
computer devices are dynamically added and removed from the network.
- Anomaly detection systems should have a very low false alarm rate. It may not be
sufficient to decrease the percentage of overall false alarms since their absolute
number may increase with increased network connectivity and traffic.
- The IDS should be able to learn from past experiences and improve its detection
capabilities over time.
- To respond to various attacks, system administrators will need to use decision
support tools. Therefore, the IDS will be required not only to detect anomalous
events, but also to take automated corrective action.
- It should be possible for the IDS to perform data fusion and process information
from multiple and distributed data sources.
- Data reduction tools will need to help the IDS process the information gathered
from data fusion techniques. Data mining tools will be helpful in running statistical
analysis tools on archived data in support of anomaly detection techniques.
- Due to rapid changes in network conditions and limited network administration
expertise, it is difficult for system administrators to diagnose problems and take
corrective action to minimize the damage that intruders can cause. Therefore, the
IDS should have the capability to provide an automated response to suspicious
activities.
- It will become necessary to detect and react to distributed and co-ordinated attacks.
Co-ordinated attacks against a network will be able to assemble greater forces and
launch many more and varied attacks against a single target. By rapidly evolving,
these attacks can be permutations of known attacks and be launched at little cost to
the attackers.
- 36 -
- As no vendor toolset is likely to excel in or provide complete coverage of the
detection, diagnosis, and response capabilities, the IDS should be able to work with
other commercial off-the-shelf security tools. The IDS framework should be able to
integrate various data reduction, forensic, host-based and network-based security
tools. The value of the IDS will be further increased by interoperability and
conformance to standards.
- After an intrusion has been detected, the IDS data often requires additional analysis
to assess any damage to the network. Although the anomalous event was the first
detected, it may not be the first attempt to gain unauthorized access to the network.
Therefore, before the network can be restored to a safe condition, post-event
analysis will be needed to identify compromised machines.
- The IDS itself must also be designed with security in mind. It should not introduce
additional vulnerabilities. It should also be able to authenticate the administrator and
audit administrator actions. The IDS data should also be protected and the IDS
devices should be authenticated.
2.6.2 Performance requirements
Although an IDS may be functionally correct, it is of little use if it detects attacks too
slowly. The IDS performance requirements include the following:
- To the extent possible, any anomalous events or breaches in security should be
detected in real-time and reported immediately. This may minimize the damage to
the network and the loss or corruption of data.
- The IDS should not impose a large overhead on the computer system. There is a
trade-off between additional levels of security monitoring and performance.
- The IDS should be scalable to enable it to handle additional computational and
communication load, as new computer devices are added to the network.
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2.7 Current shortcomings of intrusion detection systems
Current IDSs have many shortcomings. Although developers continue to address the
deficiencies by improving and refining existing techniques, some deficiencies are
inherent in the way IDSs are constructed. The most common shortcomings include the
following (Jansen, 2002):
- Lack of efficiency. Current IDSs are not efficient enough to evaluate events in real-
time in computer systems with a large number of events and on high-speed networks
with large volumes of traffic. Consequently, host-based IDSs often slow down a
system, while network-based IDSs drop network packets that they do not have time
to process. In addition, as new attacks are devised, the IDS must be updated to
discover them. Considering that old attacks are not removed from the IDS, more
processing time is required by the detection algorithm for greater attack coverage.
- High number of false positives. Current IDSs have a high false positive rate because
recognition of intrusions is not perfect. Changing thresholds to reduce false alarms
raises the number false negatives (true attacks that are not detected).
- Burdensome maintenance. To correctly configure and maintain an IDS often
requires special knowledge and substantial effort.
- Limited flexibility. IDSs have typically been written for a specific environment and
have proved difficult to use in other environments that may have similar policies
and concerns. It can also be difficult to adapt the detection mechanism to different
patterns of usage. Tailoring detection mechanisms specifically to the system in
question and replacing them over time with improved detection techniques is also
problematic with many IDS implementations. It is often necessary to restart the IDS
to allow changes and additions to take effect.
- Vulnerability to direct attack . Many IDSs are vulnerable to direct attack because
they rely on hierarchical structures for components. A control branch of the IDS can
be cut off by an attacker who attacks an internal node. Moreover, the entire IDS can
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be disabled if the root command and control node is disabled. Although such critical
components usually reside on platforms that have been hardened to resist direct
attack, current implementations lack other survivability techniques such as
redundancy, mobility, or dynamic recovery.
- Vulnerability to deception. A network-based IDS evaluates network packets by
using a generic network protocol stack to model the behaviour of the protocol stack
of the hosts that it is protecting. An attacker may take advantage of this discrepancy
by sending, to a target host, packets that have been specially adapted to be
interpreted differently by the IDS and by the target host. This can be done in various
ways, such as altering fragmentation, sequence number, and packet flags (Ptacek &
Newsham, 1998). The attacker is able to attack the target while the IDS remains
blind to the attack or is fooled into interpreting that the target resisted the attack.
- Limited response capability. Although intrusion detection is important, many times
a system administrator is not able to immediately analyse the reports from an IDS to
take appropriate action. This gives an intruder time before being countered by the
actions of the administrator. Many IDSs have begun to provide automated response
capabilities to reduce the time available for an intruder. However, their ability to
adapt dynamically to an attack is limited.
- No generic building methodology. There is no structured methodology available to
build an IDS. Consequently, the cost of building an IDS from available components
is high.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter provided theoretical background information on intrusion detection
systems. Intrusion detection systems were discussed in terms of their need,
classification, components, architectures, desirable characteristics for an IDS, as well as
the current shortcomings of IDSs. The next chapter provides theoretical background
information on mobile agents.
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  CHAPTER 3 
MOBILE AGENTS
3.1 Introduction
A software agent can be defined as (Bradshaw, 1997) "... a software entity which
functions continuously and autonomously in a particular environment ... able to carry
out activities in a flexible and intelligent manner that is responsive to changes in the
environment ... Ideally, an agent that functions continuously ... would be able to learn
from its experience. In addition, we expect an agent that inhabits an environment with
other agents and processes to be able to communicate and co-operate with them, and
perhaps move from place to place in doing so."
Software agents can be static or mobile. Stationary agents remain resident on a single
system during their execution lifetime, executing only on the system where they have
began execution. Mobile agents, on the other hand, have the ability to migrate from one
system in a network to another during their execution lifetime.
This chapter discusses mobile agents and is organized as follows. In Section 3.2,
various network computing paradigms are discussed, showing how the mobile agent
paradigm differs from other network computing paradigms. Section 3.3 discusses the
fundamental elements of a mobile agent system. This is followed by four sections,
which contain a discussion of the essential behaviour of a mobile agent: creation,
disposal, migration and communication. The potential benefits of applying mobile
agents in intrusion detection are discussed in Section 3.8. In Section 3.9, the potential
drawbacks of applying mobile agents to intrusion detection are discussed. This is
followed by a discussion of the different security issues related to the use of mobile
agents. This chapter is concluded in Section 3.11.
- 40 -
3.2 Network computing paradigms
There are various network computing paradigms that support communication between
entities in a distributed computer system. This section contains a discussion of these
paradigms to show how the mobile agent paradigm differs from other network
computing paradigms (based on Lange and Oshima (1998), and Rothermel and
Schwehm (1998)). Figure 3.1 on page 43 shows the various degrees of mobility offered
by the different paradigms that are discussed below.
3.2.1 Message passing
Message passing was the first network communication paradigm proposed. It allows
processes to communicate by explicitly sending and receiving messages. Due to its
flexibility, the concept of message passing can support many varieties of
communication patterns. However, developing distributed applications based on
message passing primitives is complex and error-prone.
3.2.2 Client-Server
The client-server paradigm was proposed to provide a higher-level communication
abstraction than message passing. It allows processes to communicate by requesting
services from other processes, rather than by explicitly sending and receiving messages.
A client process can issue requests for certain services to a server process, which
provides the service and returns the results to the client process.
This paradigm is widely known; most distributed systems have been based on it. It is
supported by technologies such as remote procedure calls (RPC), object request brokers
(CORBA), and Java remote method invocation (RMI).
The client-server paradigm provides a more convenient form of interprocess
communication than message passing. For example, with RPC, much of the complexity
associated with reliable communication is hidden in so-called stub procedures. Stub
procedures can provide methods for marshalling and unmarshalling of messages,
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encoding and decoding in heterogeneous environments, and failure recovery. However,
processes can communicate only through calling of and receiving the result of a remote
procedure; processes are restricted to communicating by requesting and receiving
services. Therefore, the client-server paradigm does not provide as much flexibility as
message passing.
3.2.3 Remote execution
In the client-server paradigm, when the client requests a service from a server, it is the
server that executes the necessary code and provides the results to the client. In many
cases, however, it is desirable to send code (e.g. a procedure) to a remote node and
execute it there. The remote execution paradigm provides for such situations and it
allows one node to send code to another node for execution.
Two distinct types of remote execution exist: remote evaluation and code-on-demand.
In remote evaluation, a client node transfers code (and the necessary data) to a server
node, which executes the code. This is a so-called "push" approach, because a service is
uploaded to a computer. Code-on-demand is the opposite of remote evaluation; a server
node transfers code (and the necessary data) to a client node. Code-on-demand is a so-
called "pull" approach, because a service is downloaded from a computer. Remote
execution provides a flexible way to dynamically extend the behaviour of servers and
clients, through remote evaluation and code-on-demand, respectively.
Examples of this paradigm are Java applets and servlets. Java applets are downloaded in
web browsers and executed locally. Java servlets, on the other hand, are uploaded to
remote web servers and executed there.
3.2.4 Mobile agents
Remote execution transfers only the code and the necessary data to a remote location; it
does not transfer an executing program. The concept of mobile agents allows an
executing program to migrate from one node to another in a computer network. For this
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to occur, both the code and the state information (also known as the agent state; see
Section 3.3.1.1) of the agent have to be transferred during agent migration.
We should note that the concept of agent migration is not the same as process
migration. The main difference between the two concepts lies in what entity decides
when migration takes place and to which destination node in the network. In the case of
process migration, the operating system makes this decision and migration is
transparent to the process. In the case of agent migration, the agent itself decides when
and where to migrate.
Existing mobile agent systems provide two forms of migration: strong migration and
weak migration (Rothermel & Schwehm, 1998):
3.2.4.1 Strong migration
In strong migration, the agent system captures the entire state of the agent (i.e. the data
and the execution state). The state and the code of the agent are then transferred to the
destination. Once the agent is received at the destination, its state is automatically
restored.
In this scheme, the capture, transfer and restoration of the complete agent state is done
transparently by the underlying agent system. However, to provide this degree of
transparency in a heterogeneous environment will require at least a global model of the
agent state and a transfer syntax for this information. In addition, the agent system must
provide functions to externalize and internalize agent state. Strong migration might also
be a time-consuming operation, since the complete agent state can be large, especially
for multithreaded agents.
3.2.4.2 Weak migration
In weak migration, the agent system does not capture the entire state of the agent, but
only its data state. The size of the data state can also be limited by allowing the
programmer to select the variables that make up the agent state. Therefore, only the data
state and the code of the agent are transferred to the destination.
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In this scheme, the programmer must encode the agent's relevant execution states in the
program variables. The programmer must also specify a start method, which will decide
where the agent should continue its execution after migration (based on the encoded
state information). Therefore, although weak migration reduces the amount of
information that must be communicated, it puts an additional burden on the programmer
and makes agent programs more complex.
Figure 3.1 Degrees of mobility (based on Rothermel and Schwehm (1998): figure 2)
3.3 The elements of a mobile agent system
There are two fundamental concepts in the mobile agent model: the agent and the place.
These two concepts are very briefly discussed in this section, by using the work of
Lange and Oshima (1998). The reader is referred to Lange and Oshima (1998) for more
detail on these concepts.
Message Passing:
Transport of data
Remote Execution:
Transport of code and data
Weak Migration:
Migration of code and data
Strong Migration:
Migration of code, data, and state
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3.3.1 The agent
A mobile agent has five attributes: state, implementation, interface, identifier, and
principals.
3.3.1.1 Agent state
The state of an agent at any time is a snapshot of its execution. It is needed by the agent
to allow it to resume execution after migration. The agent's state can be divided into its
execution state and its data state. The execution state is an agent's run-time state,
including its program counter and frame stack. The data state is the set of values of the
agent's variables.
An agent does not always need to capture and transport its entire execution state to
allow it to resume its execution at the destination. In many cases, the values of the
agent's variables are sufficient to allow it to determine what to do when it resumes its
execution at its destination.
3.3.1.2 Implementation
The implementation of an agent is the code it uses to execute. When an agent migrates,
it can take its entire implementation code to its destination, or it can go to its
destination, determine what code is already there, and retrieve any missing code over
the network.
An agent's implementation should be both executable at the destination host and be safe
for the host to execute (i.e. in a way that ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the host, its data and services). Platform independence can be provided
through scripting and interpreted languages. They also provide a controlled execution
environment that has security mechanisms that restrict access to the host's private
resources.
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3.3.1.3 Interface
The interface of an agent allows for other agents and systems to interact with it, using
an agent communication language (ACL). An agent communication language allows
agents (from different vendors) to interact with one another in a multi-agent system.
3.3.1.4 Identifier
Every agent has an identifier that is unique during its lifetime and which is assigned by
the place at which the agent is created. An identifier is used for recognition and location
of travelling agents.
3.3.1.5 Principals
The principals of an agent are needed to determine the legal and moral responsibility of
the agent. A principal is an entity whose identity can be authenticated by any system
that the principal may try to access. A principal can be an individual, an organization, or
a corporation.
For agents, there are at least two main principals: the manufacturer and the owner. The
manufacturer refers to the author, or the provider of the agent implementation. The
owner is the principal that has the legal and moral responsibility for the agents'
behaviour.
3.3.2 The place
A place provides a uniform set of services that agents can make use of. It provides a
context in which an agent can execute and it can contain multiple agents. A place is also
sometimes referred to as an agent platform.
A place itself cannot execute agents. To do that, an agent must reside inside an engine,
which serves as a virtual machine for places and their agents. An engine also provides
agents and places with links to the resources provided by the host and the underlying
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network. Any computer in the network can have multiple engines and each engine can
have multiple places.
The location of a place is determined by a combination of the name of the place and the
network address of the engine in which that place resides. This location will typically
have an IP address and a port number of the engine with a place name attribute.
A place also requires principals. It identifies the person or organization for which the
place acts (place master) as well as the manufacturer of the place. The manufacturer is
the author, or provider, of the place implementation. The place master refers to the
principal that has the responsibility for the operation of the place.
Figure 3.2 shows how the concepts of agents, places and engines relate to one another.
Figure 3.2 Place and engine (based on Lange and Oshima (1998):20)
In the following three sections, essential behaviour of mobile agents is discussed by
using the work of Lange and Oshima (1998). Therefore, references to this source will be
omitted in the next three sections.
3.4 Agent creation
An agent is created in a place. The creation of an agent can be initiated either by another
agent residing in the same place or by another agent or non-agent system outside of the
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place. Before an agent is created, its creator must authenticate itself to the place and
establish the authority and credentials that the new agent will posses. The code of the
agent must be present on the local host or a remote host. The code can also be supplied
by the creator, together with the required initialization arguments.
Three steps are required to create an agent:
1. Instantiation and identifier assignment. The code of the agent (e.g. a class
definition) is provided. The agent is also assigned a unique identifier by the place at
which it is created.
2. Initialization. The agent is initialized by using the initialization arguments that have
been provided by the creator. Once the initialization has been completed, the agent
is fully and correctly installed in the place.
3. Autonomous execution. After being fully installed in the place, the agent begins
executing.
3.5 Agent disposal
An agent can be disposed of for several reasons. For example, the agent's lifetime may
have ended; no one refers to or uses the agent; or the system is shutting down. The
disposal of an agent can be initiated by the agent itself, by other agents residing in the
same place, or by another agent or non-agent system outside of the place. An agent is
disposed of in a place.
Two steps are required to dispose of an agent:
1. Preparing for disposal. The agent is allowed to finalize its current task before it is
disposed of.
2. Suspension of execution. The place suspends the execution of the agent.
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3.6 Agent migration
Although the process of agent migration is initiated by the agent itself, the actual
transfer of the agent is managed by the origin place (the current place of the agent) and
by the destination place (the intended receiving place).
There are two stages in transferring an agent: dispatching the agent and receiving the
agent (Figure 3.3).
3.6.1 Dispatching an agent
Before a mobile agent migrates, it must identify its destination. If the agent does not
specify the place, then the agent will run in a default place, as selected by the
destination agent system. Once the location of the destination has been determined, the
mobile agent informs the local agent system that it wants to migrate to the destination
agent system. This message is sent through an internal API (Application Programming
Interface) between the agent and the agent system. When the agent system receives the
agent's request to migrate, it performs the following tasks:
1. The agent is suspended. The agent system warns the agent that it is about to be
transferred. The agent is allowed to prepare for the transfer (e.g. complete its current
task) and then its execution thread is halted.
2. The agent is serialized. The state and the code of the agent are serialized. That is, a
persistent representation of the state and the code of the agent is created so that it
can be transported over a network.
3. The agent is encoded. The serialized agent is encoded for the chosen transport
protocol.
4. The agent is transferred. The engine establishes a network connection to the
specified destination, and the encoded serialized agent is transferred.
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3.6.2 Receiving an agent
Before an engine will receive an agent, it will determine whether it can accept an agent
from the sending host. The actual data transfer will take place only after the sender has
successfully authenticated itself to the receiving engine. The following tasks are
performed by the receiving agent system:
1. The agent is received. Once the destination engine agrees to the transfer, the
encoded serialized agent is received.
2. The agent is decoded. The incoming data stream is decoded.
3. The agent is deserialized. The persistent representation of the state and the code of
the agent is deserialized; the transferred agent state is restored.
4. The agent resumes execution. The recreated agent is notified of its arrival at the
destination place. The agent prepares to resume its execution and is given a new
thread of execution.
Figure 3.3 Agent migration (Lange & Oshima, 1998:23)
Suspend Execution
Sender
Serialize Agent
Encode Data
Transfer Data
Network
Resume Execution
Receiver
Deserialize Agent
Decode Data
Receive Data
- 50 -
3.7 Agent communication
Agents have the ability to communicate with other agents that reside within the same
place, or that reside in other places. In this section, the various communication types
that agents may use to interact with one another are discussed.
3.7.1 Types of communication
There are several possible types of interactions that agents can take part in. These
include: agent / service agent interaction, mobile agent / mobile agent interaction, agent
group communication, as well as user / agent interaction (Rothermel & Schwehm,
1998).
3.7.1.1 Agent / service agent interaction
This type of interaction occurs when an agent interacts with service agents. This style of
interaction is usually client-server, since the service agents export operations (or
methods) that can be requested by other agents. An RPC-like communication should be
incorporated in the agent system to simplify the development of agent programs.
3.7.1.2 Mobile agent / mobile agent interaction
This type of interaction occurs when a mobile agent interacts with another mobile agent
in a peer-to-peer fashion. The communication patterns that may occur in this type of
interaction might not be limited to request / response only. Message passing schemes
are used to provide the required degree of flexibility.
3.7.1.3 Agent group communication
This type of interaction occurs when the sender does not know the identities of the
agents that are interested in the sent message. Such a situation may occur when, for
example, a given task is performed by a group of agents, with each agent taking over a
subtask. In this case, the agent that requested the task may not know the identities of the
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individual agents of the group. Therefore, communication is anonymous in the sense
that the sender only knows the group rather than the individual group members. This
type of communication is supported by group communication protocols, shared memory
and event messages (where an agent will send out event messages anonymously, and
the receivers explicitly register for those events they are interested in).
3.7.1.4 User / agent interaction
This type of interaction occurs when human users communicate with software agents.
3.7.2 Messaging schemes
Inter-agent communication can follow three different messaging schemes: now-type
messaging, future-type messaging, and one-way-type messaging (Lange & Oshima,
1998).
3.7.2.1 Now-type messaging
In this scheme, messages are synchronous. This implies that, when an agent sends a
message, its execution is blocked until the receiver of the message has completed the
handling of the message and has replied to it. This scheme is the most commonly used
messaging scheme.
3.7.2.2 Future-type messaging
In this scheme, messages are asynchronous. Therefore, when an agent sends a message,
its execution is not blocked; the agent can continue executing while it waits for the
reply. The sending agent retains a handle, which is used to obtain the result of the
message. This messaging scheme is useful when multiple agents communicate with one
another, because the sender does not need to wait until the receiver responds and sends
the reply.
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3.7.2.3 One-way-type messaging
In this scheme, messages are asynchronous and the sending agent does not retain a
handle for such messages. Therefore, the sending agent does not expect a reply from the
receiving agent. This messaging scheme is convenient when agents are allowed to
interact with one another where the message-sending agents do not expect any replies
from the message-receiving agents.
3.7.3 Sessions
A variety of agent systems require that the interacting agents establish a session (or a
communication relationship in general) before they communicate (Rothermel &
Schwehm, 1998). Sessions are required in situations where stateful interactions have to
be supported, where an explicit communication relationship is a prerequisite. Sessions
allow for synchronization of agents that want to meet for co-operation; they allow
agents to identify other agents that are interested to meet at certain places. Furthermore,
sessions allow agents to synchronize themselves on the event when all session peers are
available and willing to co-operate.
An agent must explicitly agree to participate in sessions and may unilaterally terminate
the session it is involved in at any time. Once a session is established, the agents can
interact by remote procedure calls or by message passing. The session is explicitly
terminated when all information has been communicated. While an agent is involved in
a session, it should not move to another place. However, if an agent does move to
another place while involved in a session, the session is implicitly terminated. This
requirement simplifies the underlying communication mechanism; for example, it
avoids the need for message forwarding.
A session may be an inter- or an intra-place communication relationship. In an inter-
place session, agents are able to communicate from different places. An intra-place
session, on the other hand, requires that all communication be local. Therefore, an intra-
place session places restrictions on agents because they cannot communicate from
different places, but need to be located at one place.
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3.8 Advantages of applying mobile agents in intrusion
detection
There are several benefits derived from applying mobile agents in distributed systems
(Lange & Oshima, 1998). In this section, the benefits of mobile agents are discussed
with reference to their applicability to the design of intrusion detection systems (Jansen,
2002; Jansen et al., 2000; and Jansen et al., 1999).
3.8.1 Reduction of network load
A distributed system often relies on communication protocols that involve multiple
interactions to accomplish a task. This generates a considerable amount of network
traffic. By using mobile agents, the interaction can be packaged and dispatched to a
destination host, where the interactions can take place locally. Mobile agents can also
reduce the need to transport large amounts of raw data in a network. For example, a
large amount of network traffic will be generated when there are several hosts in the
network that must transport large volumes of raw data for processing at some other host.
Mobile agents can reduce the amount of network traffic by processing the data locally at
each remote host and sending only the results. Therefore, by using mobile agents, the
computation is moved to the data, instead of moving the data to the computation.
Current IDSs often need to process large amounts of data generated by network traffic
monitoring tools and host-based audit logs. This data is typically processed locally.
Abstracted data is often sent to other network locations where it is further abstracted and
then eventually sent to a central processing node, which evaluates the abstracted results
from all locations in the network. Although the data is usually abstracted before being
sent out on the network, the amount of data may still place a significant communication
load on the network.
The amount of data sent over the network can be reduced by dispatching mobile agents
to the hosts on which the intrusion data resides. The mobile agent processes the data
locally and sends only the results to the central processing node. Clearly, transferring an
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agent that is smaller in size than the data that needs to be transferred reduces the
network load.
3.8.2 Overcoming network latency
Network latency can be reduced by sending an agent with a sequence of service requests
across the network rather than by issuing each service request by a separate remote
procedure call.
An IDS, in addition to detecting intrusions, should also provide an appropriate response
to intrusions to protect the computer system. A central controller can be used to send
messages to the nodes within the network and issue instructions on how to respond to a
detected intrusion. However, the central controller can become a bottleneck or a single
point of failure if it must respond to a large number of events throughout the network
and also handle its normal processing load. If the connections to this central server are
slow or unreliable, the network communications are susceptible to unacceptable delays.
Mobile agents can be dispatched from a central controller to carry out operations
directly at a remote place of interest. This allows them to respond, in real-time, to
changes in their environment. Mobile agents can also take advantage of alternate routes
around any problem communication lines. In addition to detecting and diagnosing
potential network intrusions, mobile agents can also provide an appropriate response
mechanism.
3.8.3 Asynchronous and autonomous execution
An IDS architecture that is co-ordinated by a central host requires reliable
communication paths to the network sensors and intermediate processing nodes. The
critical role played by this central controller makes it a likely target of attack.
An IDS based on mobile agents can continue to operate in the event of failure of a
central controller or a communication link. Unlike message passing routines or remote
procedure calls, once a mobile agent has been launched from its home platform, it can
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continue to operate autonomously even if its home platform is no longer available or
connected to the network. Therefore, a mobile agent's inability to communicate with a
central controller would not prevent it from carrying out its assigned tasks. In addition,
the agents that survive an attack may be able to reconstruct damaged components by
cloning to restore lost functionality.
3.8.4 Dynamic adaptation
Mobile agents have the ability to sense their execution environment and autonomously
react to changes. Multiple mobile agents are able to distribute themselves among the
hosts of the network in order to maintain the optimal configuration for solving a
particular problem. For example, an agent and its data can move to another computer if
the computation load of its current host platform is too high and the host's performance
does not meet the service expectations of the agent.
3.8.5 Operating in heterogeneous environments
Large computer networks usually have many different computing platforms and
computing devices. Since mobile agents are generally computer and transport-layer
independent, and dependent only on their execution environment, they provide a good
approach for integrating heterogeneous systems. The ability of mobile agents to operate
in heterogeneous computer environments is made possible by a virtual machine or
interpreter on the host platform. However, virtual machines and interpreters offer only
limited support for the preservation and resumption of an agent's execution state in a
heterogeneous environment, because of differing representations in the underlying
computer hardware.
Although mobile agents allow an IDS to operate in a heterogeneous environment, the
tests performed by, or the tasks assigned to, mobile agents are often platform-
dependent. Therefore, unless there will be a common programming interface available
for intrusion-detection functions, the agents must either be restricted to a single class of
host or be designed to provide heterogeneity in some other way (e.g. by dynamically
loading the host-dependent code).
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3.8.6 Robust and fault-tolerant behaviour
Mobile agents have the ability to react dynamically to unfavourable situations and
events, which makes it easier to build robust and fault-tolerant distributed systems. For
example, when a host is being shut down, the agents executing on that host may be
warned (whenever possible) and given time to migrate and continue their operation at
another host. Mobile agents can also clone themselves for redundancy and parallelism,
or request assistance from other agents. These characteristics, when combined with
asynchronous and autonomous execution, facilitate the building of robust and fault-
tolerant systems.
3.8.7 Scalability
As more processing nodes are added to networks monitored by a centralized IDS, the
computational load of the IDS increases. Even greater demands on these centralized
architectures will be placed as the bandwidth and traffic of the network increase.
To provide IDS scalability, the computational load can be distributed by using a
distributed IDS architecture. As the number of computing elements in the network
increases, agents can be cloned and dispatched to new computers.
3.9 Disadvantages of applying mobile agents in intrusion
detection
In spite of the numerous advantages of applying mobile agents in intrusion detection,
there are also several disadvantages (Jansen, 2002; Jansen et al., 2000; Jansen et al.,
1999).
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3.9.1 Security concerns
The main obstacles to the widespread use of mobile agents are security concerns related
to the use of mobile code. The different security concerns and countermeasures are
discussed in Section 3.10.
3.9.2 Performance
One of the most challenging problems facing IDSs is improving the speed with which
they can detect intrusions. System events must be processed in real-time and attacks
must be detected quickly. This is more difficult to achieve as network bandwidth
increases.
Mobile agent software will generally hinder rather than help an IDS's ability to rapidly
process events and detect attacks. The runtime environments for mobile agents slow
down an IDS based on mobile agents. This is especially apparent if mobile agents are
implemented in slow interpreted languages.
3.9.3 Code size
Agents that perform IDS services may need to contain a large amount of code. The code
size may be increased even more if the agents are to perform operating-system-specific
tasks on multiple operating systems. The long time that is needed to transfer an agent
between hosts may limit the functionality of an IDS based on mobile agents.
Furthermore, greater computing and network resources will be needed for such a
transfer.
3.9.4 Lack of a priori knowledge
Large enterprise networks are usually comprised of several different hardware platforms
that may use different operating systems, have different configurations and run different
applications. It is not simple to create lightweight agents that have a priori knowledge
about how a system is configured and how data is arranged.
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3.9.5 Limited exposure
The area of distributed control of mobile agent systems is not as well understood and as
quite mature as, for example, the client-server computing paradigm. The autonomous
behaviour of agents, involving collaboration with other agents at various network
locations, creates a dynamic environment that requires new design methodologies and
modelling tools to properly formulate and construct agent-based systems. This task is
made difficult by the lack of mature agent design methodologies and modelling tools.
This problem is likely to be overcome as commercial demand for these products
increases.
3.9.6 Coding and deployment difficulties
The standard development process historically produces code with many faults. Given
the added complexity of mobile agents, such as moving and cloning, IDSs based on
mobile agents may be even more prone to faults. There is also a lack of mobile agent
design, development, and management tools needed before any large-scale deployment
of agent-based applications becomes feasible. This also hampers near-term deployment
of an IDS based on mobile agents.
3.10 Security issues of mobile agents
The use of mobile agents has several security concerns that hinder the widespread use of
this technology. There are four broad categories of security threats related to the use of
mobile agents (Jansen & Karygiannis, 1999):
1. Agent-to-agent, in which an agent exploits the vulnerabilities of other agents
residing on the same agent platform.
2. Agent-to-platform, in which an agent exploits the vulnerabilities of its platform.
3. Platform-to-agent, in which the agent platform compromises the agent's security.
4. Other-to-platform, in which external entities threaten the security of the agent
platform.
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3.10.1 Types of threats
There are several threats related to the use of mobile agents (Jansen & Karygiannis,
1999; Jansen, 1999).
3.10.1.1 Masquerading
Masquerading occurs when one entity claims the identity of another. This attack can
occur in the following threat categories:
- Agent-to-agent, in which an agent attempts to disguise its true identity so as to
mislead other agents. Masquerading as another agent harms both the agent that is
being mislead and the agent who's identity has been assumed (e.g. the reputation of
such an agent may be damaged by the masquerading agent).
- Agent-to-platform, in which an agent attempts to claim the identity of another agent
so as to mislead an agent platform. This may allow the masquerading agent to pose
as an authorized agent to allow it to gain access to services and resources of an agent
platform it would otherwise be unable to access. By claiming the identity of another
agent, the masquerading agent may damage the trust of the legitimate agent. An
agent can also pose as an unauthorized agent in an effort to not be held accountable
for some actions.
- Platform-to-agent, in which an agent platform claims the identity of another agent
platform in an effort to deceive agents as to the platform's true identity and
corresponding security domain. Once the agent is captured by the platform, the
platform can access and modify the agent's code, state, and data.
- Other-to-platform, in which an agent on a remote platform disguises itself as
another agent in an attempt to gain access to services and resources to which it is not
entitled. Masquerading can also take place when a remote platform disguises itself
as another platform to mislead other platforms or agents about its true identity. A
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masquerading agent can also act in conjunction with a malicious agent platform to
help deceive another remote platform.
3.10.1.2 Denial-of-service
A denial-of-service attack occurs when one entity's services are not accessible to entities
that are authorized to use them. A denial-of-service attack can occur in the following
threat categories:
- Agent-to-agent, in which an agent attempts to interfere with the normal execution of
other agents. Such an attack may be launched by, for example, the agent repeatedly
sending messages to other agents, which may place undue burden on the message
handling routines of the recipient. A malicious agent can also intentionally distribute
false or useless information in an effort to prevent other agents from completing
their tasks correctly or in a timely manner.
- Agent-to-platform, in which an agent consumes an excessive amount of computing
resources of the platform. The performance of the agent platform may be
significantly reduced or even result in the termination of the agent platform. This
attack can be launched both intentionally, by providing code to exploit system
vulnerabilities, but also unintentionally as a result of programming errors.
- Platform-to-agent, in which an agent platform interferes with the normal execution
of an agent by, for example, ignoring requests for services from an agent,
introducing unacceptable delays for critical tasks, not executing the agent code at
all, or terminating the agent without notification.
- Other-to-platform, in which external entities execute the conventional denial-of-
service attacks, aimed at the underlying operating system or communication
protocols.
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3.10.1.3 Unauthorized access
An unauthorized access attack occurs when an entity accesses another entity without
authorization. This attack can occur in the following threat categories:
- Agent-to-agent, in which an agent attempts to directly access parts of other agents.
For example, an agent can invoke the public methods of another agent (e.g. attempt
a buffer overflow, or reset the agent to its initial state), or access and modify the
agent's data or code. This is a serious threat because if the agent platform has weak
or no control mechanisms, modification of an agent's code can change a trusted
agent into a malicious one.
- Agent-to-platform, in which an agent accesses the agent platform and its services
without proper authorization. Such attacks are the result of inadequate access
controls and agent authentication.
- Other-to-platform, in which remote users, processes, and agents request services and
resources of the agent platform to which they are not entitled.
3.10.1.4 Repudiation
Repudiation is applicable to the agent-to-agent threat category. It occurs when an agent
has participated in a transaction or communication, but claims that the transaction or
communication did not take place. For example, a malicious agent may request some
service from another agent, but later deny that it requested the service.
3.10.1.5 Eavesdropping
This attack is applicable to the platform-to-agent threat category. It occurs when an
agent platform secretly monitors the communication between agents on the platform,
monitors the instructions executed by agents, as well as all unencrypted data brought by
the agent to the platform and the data generated by the agent on the platform. Even if
agents do not expose any sensitive data, the platform can infer the meaning from the
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types of services requested and from the identities of the agents with which it
communicates.
3.10.1.6 Alteration of agents
This attack is applicable in the platform-to-agent threat category, and occurs when an
agent platform alters the code, state, or data of an agent. Alteration can also occur to
agent communications, where the platform attempts to alter the contents of messages
passed between agents.
3.10.1.7 Copy-and-replay
The copy-and-replay attack is applicable to the other-to-agent platform threat category.
It occurs when an interceptor attempts to intercept an agent or an agent message in
transit in order to copy the agent, or agent message, and clone it or retransmit it. This
may disrupt the synchronization or integrity of the agent framework.
3.10.2 Countermeasures
In this subsection, only an outline of the different countermeasures available against the
above threats is provided. The countermeasures are discussed in detail in Jansen (1999)
and in Jansen and Karygiannis (1999).
3.10.2.1 Countermeasures against platform threats
Countermeasures against platform threats include both conventional mechanisms
employed in distributed applications and also those specifically developed for
protecting mobile agent platforms.
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The conventional mechanisms employed in distributed applications that can be applied
to protecting mobile agent platforms include:
- Mechanisms for isolating processes from one another and from the control process.
- Mechanisms for controlling access to computational resources.
- Mechanisms for auditing security-relevant events occurring at the agent platform.
- Cryptographic methods for enciphering information exchanges and for the
identification and authentication of users, agents and platforms.
Techniques developed more recently aimed at mobile code, and which are applicable to
mobile agent security, include the following:
- Using interpreted script or programming language to develop agents.
- Limiting the capabilities of agent languages so that they are considered "safe".
- Using digital signatures and other information to indicate the authenticity of agents.
- Using various techniques to restrict an agent's capabilities, including constraining
the resources that an agent may use (e.g. by constricting the lifetime and storage of
an agent), controlling access to services (e.g. network destinations), and making
capabilities location-dependent.
3.10.2.2 Countermeasures against agent threats
Countermeasures against agent threats tend to concentrate on detecting, rather than on
preventing malicious behaviour. This is due to the fact that an agent is completely
susceptible to an agent platform and cannot prevent malicious behaviour from
occurring, but may be able to detect it.
If it is assumed that an agent trusts its home platform to provide the required support
services and will not subvert the agent's activities, then the platform can be allowed to
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apply conventional security techniques as countermeasures on behalf of the agent.
These counter measures include the following:
- Issuing users and agent platforms public key certificates for authentication.
- Conveying information, such as agents and their messages, securely among agent
platforms.
- Detecting and ignoring replay attacks aimed against agent platforms.
- Enabling an agent to audit platform services and other security-related events for
post-processing analysis and detection.
Besides these conventional techniques, there are other approaches that have also been
proposed. These include the following:
- Subjecting agents to state appraisal as a complement to signed code. This is to
ensure that an agent has not been subverted as a result of alteration of its state
information.
- Proof carrying code, which requires agents to carry proof of safety properties of its
code. For example, the code producer (e.g. the agent's author) must formally prove
that the program possesses safety properties that have been previously stipulated by
the code consumer (e.g. the security policy of the agent platform).
- Requiring agents to maintain a record of the platforms visited by the agent.
- Requiring agent platforms to maintain execution traces of an agent's code.
- Enabling agents to execute encrypted functions safely at an agent platform.
3.11 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to provide theoretical background information on
mobile agents. First, the mobile agent paradigm was compared to other network
computing paradigms. Then, the basic elements of a mobile agent system were
discussed, together with the basic mobile agent behaviour. This chapter also discussed
the potential advantages and disadvantages of applying mobile agents to intrusion
detection. Security issues related to the use of mobile agents have also been discussed.
The next chapter provides a brief overview of the human immune system.
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  CHAPTER 4 
AN OVERVIEW OF
THE HUMAN I MMUNE SYSTEM
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of the human immune system is to protect the body from harmful invaders,
such as bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites. In this chapter, the human immune system
is briefly discussed. This will be necessary to understand how its concepts have been
applied to the IDS proposed in the next chapter. The chapter is organized as follows. In
Section 4.2, a short overview of the human immune system is presented. This is
followed by Section 4.3, which discusses some of the immune system's properties that
enable it to effectively detect intrusions. This chapter is concluded in Section 4.4.
4.2 An overview of the human immune system
The overview presented in this section is largely incomplete and simplified, with many
important aspects of the immune system not discussed. Only enough information is
provided to understand how its concepts have been applied to the IDS proposed in the
next chapter. This overview is based on Davies (1997), De Castro and
Von Zuben (1999), as well as the overviews of the immune system presented by
Forrest, Hofmeyr and Somayaji (1997); Somayaji, Hofmeyr and Forrest (1997); and
Kim and Bentley (1999).
The human immune system is based on the concept of distinguishing molecules and
cells of the body, called "self", from foreign ones, called "non-self", and elimination of
the latter. Its function is implemented through the interactions between a large number
of different types of cells rather than by one particular organ.
- 66 -
The architecture of the human immune system is multi-layered; its protection layers can
be divided into:
- Physical barriers. The skin is an example of a physical barrier and forms the
outermost barrier of protection. Other physical barriers include the secretion of oils
or mucus in the respiratory and digestive tracts, as well as coughing and sneezing.
- Physiologic barriers. The body's temperature and pH present unfavourable life
conditions for some invaders. In addition, some body fluids, such as saliva, tears and
stomach acids, contain destructive enzymes that can kill certain bacteria.
- The barrier formed by the innate and the adaptive immune system . These systems
eliminate pathogens that were successful against the physical and physiologic
barriers and have entered the body. The innate immune system mainly consists of
circulating scavenger cells (such as macrophages) that ingest extracellular molecules
and materials. The adaptive immune system is responsible for immunity that is
adaptively acquired during the lifetime of the organism. The rest of this section
focuses on the adaptive immune system because of its ability to adapt to detect
many different and previously unseen invaders.
The adaptive immune system can be viewed as a distributed intrusion detection system
in the body. The organs of the adaptive immune system, called lymphoid organs, are
positioned throughout the body (e.g. tonsils, thymus, and bone marrow). The lymphoid
organs are responsible for the production, growth, development, and storage of
lymphocytes, which are also known as white blood cells.
White blood cells play a major role in the adaptive immune system. They function as
small, disposable and independent intrusion detectors that circulate through the body in
the blood and lymph systems. Each white blood cell is specialized to ignore self-cells
and bind to a small number of structurally related non-self cells. Therefore, they can be
considered as negative detectors, because they detect non-self patterns and ignore self
patterns.
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Detection and binding to non-self cells is accomplished through special receptors on
white blood cells. Binding of a non-self cell to a white blood cell occurs when
molecular bonds are formed between a non-self cell and the receptors on the white
blood cell. The structure of the receptors is such that they will bind to a particular
peptide (a sequence of amino acids, which make up proteins). As different types of cells
contain different proteins, the receptors allow a white blood cell to recognize specific
non-self cells and bind to them. After binding, many events still take place, usually
resulting in scavenger cells (macrophages) eliminating the antigen.
The ability of the human immune system to detect a large variety of pathogens is partly
due to the process through which the binding regions, or receptors, of lymphocytes are
created. The receptors are created by a pseudo-random genetic process, which generates
a large variety of receptors. This process may, however, lead to the creation of receptors
that will bind to self-cells. To prevent binding to self-cells, the lymphocytes must first
mature in the thymus before they are released to the rest of the body. There are several
maturation stages, one of which is a process called negative selection. During the
process of negative selection, any lymphocyte that binds to a self-cell circulating in the
thymus is destroyed. Those lymphocytes that do not bind to self-cells leave the thymus
and become part of the active immune system.
4.3 Properties that enable the immune system to effectively
combat intrusions
Based on a study of the human immune system, Somayaji, Hofmeyr and Forrest (1997),
and Forrest, Hofmeyr and Somayaji (1997) have presented many of its properties that
can serve as design principles of a computer immune system. The human immune
system has evolved many important properties that enable it to effectively combat
intrusions. The properties relevant to the proposed IDS are discussed below.
1. Distributability. The immune system is highly distributed. No central co-ordination
takes place; infections can be locally recognized by lymphocytes. Distributability
greatly enhances the system's robustness.
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2. Diversity. The immune system of each individual in a population is unique. This
ensures that not all individuals will be vulnerable to the same pathogen to the same
degree, thereby enhancing the survival of the population as a whole.
3. Disposability. Any cell of the immune system can be replaced. Therefore, there is
no single component that is essential to the system's function.
4. Autonomy. There is no need for outside management or maintenance in the immune
system; pathogens are autonomously classified and eliminated.
5. Adaptability. The system can adapt by learning to detect new pathogens. At the
same time, it is also able to recognize previously seen pathogens through immune
memory.
6. Anomaly detection. The immune system is said to perform anomaly detection
because it is able to detect pathogens that it has not encountered before.
7. Dynamically changing coverage. The immune system is unable to maintain a set of
detectors large enough to cover the space of all pathogens. Therefore, at any time,
only a random sample of detectors circulates throughout the body. This sample of
detectors is constantly changing through cell death and reproduction.
8. Identity via behaviour. Peptides, or protein fragments, serve as indicators of
behaviour through which identity is verified.
9. Detection is imperfect. Not every pathogen is matched exactly by a pre-existing
detector. This increases the system's flexibility with which it can allocate resources.
For example, although a less specific lymphocyte will be less efficient at detecting a
particular pathogen, it can detect a greater variety of pathogens.
These properties of the human immune system not only enable it to effectively detect
and eliminate intrusions, but they also make the system fault-tolerant. The system can
remain functional even when many of its components have failed.
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4.4 Conclusion
The role of the immune system in the body is analogous to that of a computer security
system in computing (Forrest, Hofmeyr & Somayaji, 1997). In the case of a computer
security system, "self" may be defined as any normal activity and "non-self" may be
defined as any form of abnormal activity, such as an unauthorized user, virus, worm, or
Trojan horse. Although many differences exist between living organisms and computer
systems, the similarities could point the way to improved computer security.
If the properties of the immune system are applied to an IDS, together with the
capabilities and advantages of mobile agents, then the fault-tolerance of the IDS can be
improved. Such an IDS can also remain operational even when most of its components
have been attacked and disabled. A possible IDS design based on mobile agents and
which applies some of the properties of the immune system is described in the next
chapter.
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  CHAPTER 5 
AN I NTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
BASED ON CONCEPTS OF
THE HUMAN I MMUNE SYSTEM
AND MOBILE AGENTS
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, some of the main properties of the human immune system have
been briefly discussed and included the following:
- The system uses anomaly detection to detect intrusions.
- Recognition of intrusions is based on distinguishing "self" from "non-self".
- Lymphocytes, or white blood cells, play an important role in the human immune
system. They can be viewed as small, independent, and disposable intrusion
detectors that circulate in their domain.
- The detectors are stored in and released by lymphoid organs.
Several approaches for building computer security architectures that incorporate
principles of the human immune system have been proposed by Somayaji, Hofmeyr and
Forrest (1997). One approach suggested was to implement the adaptive immune system
layer by kernel-assisted lymphocyte processes, or mobile agents, that can migrate
between computers. With help from the kernel, the lymphocyte processes are able to
query other processes to determine if they are functioning normally. Nevertheless, the
authors did not provide further details about this particular suggested approach. We
used this suggestion in our earlier work (Zielinski & Venter, 2004) and proposed an IDS
based on the above properties of the immune system. In this chapter, we discuss our
proposed IDS in greater detail.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 defines "self" in the context of an IDS
and explains how it is used by the IDS. In Section 5.3, mobile agents are discussed,
which use the definition of "self" to act as independent intrusion detectors of the
proposed IDS. Section 5.4 discusses lymphoid hosts, which are computers that act as
the lymphoid organs of the immune system and are responsible for creating and
releasing mobile agents. This is followed by Section 5.5, which contains a discussion of
the two stages that comprise the operation of the IDS: the training stage and the
anomaly detection stage. A discussion of how concepts of the immune system have
been applied in the IDS is presented in Section 5.6. The chapter is concluded in
Section 5.7.
5.2 A definition of "self"
Before the IDS can detect intrusions, we must define what will be considered as an
intrusion. In the immune system, an intrusion is considered to be any cell or molecule
that is foreign to the body; intrusions are recognized by distinguishing molecules and
cells of the body, called "self", from foreign ones, called "non-self". In a similar way,
we define the terms "self" and "non-self" in the context of the proposed IDS and use the
definitions as a basis for recognizing intrusions.
In the proposed IDS, "self" is defined as the normal behaviour of privileged processes.
Behaviour of a privileged process that significantly deviates from its normal, or "self",
behaviour is termed "non-self" and is considered as a possible intrusion.
5.2.1 Defining normal behaviour
As a program executes, it requires certain services from the operating system, such as
I/O or resource allocation. A process requests services from the operating system
through system calls, which can be generated directly or indirectly (e.g. by calling a
run-time routine that makes the system call) (Silberschatz & Galvin, 1999). Therefore,
every process implicitly specifies a set of system call sequences that it can produce. The
ordering of system calls in the set of the possible execution paths through a program
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determines these sequences. Some subset of these sequences will be determined during
the normal execution of a program. Although the theoretical sets of system call
sequences for complex programs will be large, the local (short range) ordering of
system calls appears to be remarkably consistent (Forrest et al., 1996).
Normal behaviour of a program is defined to be the collection of short sequences of
system calls made by the program during its normal execution (i.e. when no intrusions
occur). This definition has been introduced in Forrest et al. (1996) and is used by the
proposed IDS. The system calls are observed and recorded during the training stage of
the IDS, as described in Section 5.5.1.
Preliminary experiments performed by Forrest, Hofmeyr and Somayaji (1997) on a
limited set of intrusions and other anomalous behaviour show that short sequences of
system calls (e.g. with a length of 6) provide a compact signature for self that
distinguishes normal from abnormal behaviour.
The IDS is restricted to monitoring privileged processes (i.e. processes with root /
supervisor access) for several reasons. Privileged processes are allowed to bypass the
security mechanism of the kernel in order to accomplish their tasks. They are also
trusted not to compromise the security of the system. However, due to possible errors,
privileged programs may have vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by attackers.
Therefore, privileged processes are considered more dangerous than user processes
because they have greater access to the computer system. In addition, a natural
boundary with respect to external probes and intrusions is created by root processes,
especially those that listen to a particular port. We have also decided not to monitor user
behaviour because the "normal" behaviour of processes is far more limited and stable
than the "normal" behaviour of users (Forrest et al., 1996; Ko, Fink & Levitt, 1994).
However, users are monitored indirectly through the monitoring of any privileged
processes created by them. This leads to a simpler definition of normal behaviour and
could result in fewer false positives observed during the operation of the IDS.
The above definition of normal behaviour ignores certain aspects of process behaviour.
For example, the parameter values passed to system calls and the instruction sequences
between system calls are not considered. At this stage, this definition is sufficient for
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our purpose, as our main goal is to demonstrate how an IDS can be designed using
mobile agents and certain aspects of the immune system. If, in future, it will be
necessary to include other aspects of process behaviour, then only the definition of
normal behaviour will need to change, together with the mechanism used to distinguish
between normal and abnormal behaviour.
5.2.2 Storing normal behaviour
A separate database, called a self-database, of normal behaviour for each desired
program is created by examining the sequences of system calls made during the normal
execution of a program. This occurs during the training stage of the IDS's operation, and
is described in Section 5.5.1. The database is specific to a particular architecture,
software version and configuration, local administrative policies, and usage patterns.
Since there is a large variability in how individual systems are currently configured and
used, the individual databases provide a unique definition of self for most systems
(Forrest, Hofmeyr & Somayaji, 1997). The different databases defining self are stored
by several hosts in the network, called lymphoid hosts, which are discussed in
Section 5.4.
5.3 Mobile agents
The function of detecting intrusions is divided and placed within mobile agents, which
travel from host to host in the network. Mobile agents form the data analysis component
of the IDS and data is analysed at the same hosts where it is collected. Since the number
and the locations of the data analysis components are dependent on the current number
and the locations of the mobile agents in the computer network, the IDS is considered to
be distributed.
The proposed IDS has one type of mobile agent for each type of privileged program that
it can monitor. Each mobile agent can detect anomalies in the behaviour of a particular
type of privileged program. Therefore, mobile agents do not actually detect intrusions,
but rather detect anomalies in the behaviour of an executing program. The anomalies
detected by an agent may indeed be signs of intrusions (i.e. a true positive). However, it
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is also possible that an agent detects a behaviour anomaly that is not a sign of an
intrusion. In such cases, the anomaly represents program behaviour that is legitimate,
but which is treated as anomalous by the agent because this behaviour has not been
recorded as part of the normal behaviour of the program (i.e. a false positive). A
detailed description of the way in which the IDS uses mobile agents to detect intrusions
is presented in Section 5.5.
The choice to restrict a mobile agent to monitor only a specific type of executing
program has been made for two reasons. Firstly, by allowing an agent to recognize
abnormal behaviour of only a specific program, the agent is kept small because it needs
to memorize the normal behaviour of only that specific program. Secondly, this
specialization resembles the approach found in the immune system, where each white
blood cell is specialized to bind to only a limited set of structurally related pathogens
(intruders). Similarly, a mobile agent of the IDS is specialized to detect anomalies in the
behaviour of only a particular type of privileged process.
At any time, the types of mobile agents that are present in the network determine the
types of privileged programs that can be monitored. The desired rate of intrusion
detection (i.e. how quickly an intrusion should be detected) is determined by how many
mobile agents of each type are present in the network.
5.4 Lymphoid hosts
As explained in Chapter 4, the lymphoid organs of the adaptive immune system are
positioned throughout the body and store white blood cells. White blood cells function
as small, disposable, and independent intrusion detectors that circulate through the body
in the blood and lymph systems. Similarly, the IDS has several hosts, called lymphoid
hosts, positioned at different places in a computer network. (The name "lymphoid host"
has been chosen because these hosts play the role of the lymphoid organs of the body.)
A lymphoid host possesses all the necessary capabilities required to send independent
detectors (mobile agents) that can detect anomalies in the behaviour of privileged
processes.
- 75 -
A lymphoid host has the following responsibilities:
1. It stores the self-database of each privileged program that the IDS can monitor.
2. It decides when and which mobile agents to create.
3. It receives intrusion alerts from mobile agents. It can also respond to the alerts in
several ways.
4. It provides the user interface through which the system administrator can learn of
intrusions, issue commands to and change the configuration of the IDS.
The function of creating mobile agents is static, because it is provided by the (static)
lymphoid hosts. However, the function of intrusion detection is mobile because it is
provided through mobile agents (although mobile agents report intrusions to a static
component of the IDS). The mobility of the intrusion-detection function is one of the
main differences between the proposed IDS and an IDS that is based on only static
components.
Although all lymphoid hosts have the capability to create mobile agents for intrusion
detection, at any time, only one lymphoid host, called the primary lymphoid host, will
be assigned this responsibility. The remaining lymphoid hosts serve as backups in case
the primary lymphoid host is disabled or is otherwise made unavailable (e.g. as a result
of a communication link failure).
The backup lymphoid hosts are each assigned a number, from 1 to n, where n is the total
number of backup lymphoid hosts. This is needed to decide which backup host will take
over the functions of a failed primary lymphoid host. When the primary lymphoid host
fails, the backup lymphoid host with the lowest number becomes the primary lymphoid
host and takes over its functions.
To allow the backup lymphoid hosts to know when the primary lymphoid host is
unavailable, the primary lymphoid host periodically sends the backup lymphoid hosts a
special message. This message notifies the recipient that the sender is still operating.
When a backup lymphoid host does not receive this message within a predetermined
period of time, it can assume that the primary lymphoid host has failed, or that the link
between the primary and the backup lymphoid host has failed, or that the message has
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been lost. The backup lymphoid hosts then wait for another time period to receive this
message. If, after this time, they do not receive the message, the lowest numbered
backup lymphoid host becomes the primary lymphoid host.
Therefore, a backup lymphoid host has to wait for a period of time before it can decide
that the primary lymphoid host has failed and that it should take over the failed host's
function. During this period of time, there will be no assigned primary lymphoid host.
However, this does not imply that the computer system, which the IDS is monitoring,
can be exploited by an attacker during the period when there is no assigned primary
lymphoid host - the created mobile agents are still active and can still detect signs of
possible intrusions. That is, the lack of a primary lymphoid host does not affect the
mobile agents' task of intrusion-detection.
The lack of a primary lymphoid host does, however, affect the mobile agents' intrusion-
reporting task. That is, the mobile agents are no longer able to report possible intrusions
to the primary lymphoid host and must report intrusions to another host. Whenever a
mobile agent will want to report an intrusion to the original primary lymphoid host and
will notice that it is not available, it will report the intrusion to the backup lymphoid
host that now acts as the primary lymphoid host. Therefore, there should be a
mechanism to ensure that mobile agents will know to which lymphoid host they should
report intrusions when the primary lymphoid host is no longer available. For this
purpose, we propose that the first task of the backup lymphoid host, when it becomes a
primary lymphoid host, is to broadcast this fact to all the mobile agents. Although this
approach will create additional network traffic, it is preferred over providing each
mobile agent with a hard-coded list of all the lymphoid hosts available in the network.
5.5 Operation of the IDS
In the immune system, intrusions (in the form of pathogens) are detected by searching
for abnormal or "non-self" peptide patterns (see Section 4.2). The proposed IDS
employs anomaly detection, just as the immune system does, because intrusions are
detected by searching for abnormal or "non-self" sequences of system calls generated
during a program's execution.
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The operation of the proposed IDS is based on the following three assumptions (Forrest
et al., 1996):
1. There are no intrusions during the time when the normal behaviour of a program is
determined. If an intrusion occurs while the normal behaviour of a program is
determined, then that particular intrusion will be regarded as part of the normal
behaviour of the program. Such an intrusion will not be noticed when the IDS will
be monitoring that program.
2. The sequence of system calls executed by a program is locally consistent during its
normal operation. The code of most programs is static and system calls occur at
fixed locations within the code. Although the relative ordering of the invoked
system calls will be changed by conditionals and function calls, no variation to
short-range correlations will necessarily be introduced.
3. A short, unusual sequence of system calls will be executed when a vulnerability in a
program is exploited. For example, if an intruder replaces code of a running
program, it would likely execute a sequence of system calls that is not found in the
normal database. It is also likely that a successful intruder will need to fork a new
process in order to exploit the system. This fork should be detectable when it occurs.
In addition, attacks will also be noticed when a program enters an unusual error state
during an attempted intrusion, provided that the error condition executes a sequence
of system calls that is not in the normal database. Therefore, to detect intrusions, the
sequence of system calls executed must be sufficiently different from the ones
observed during the training stage.
An IDS that employs anomaly detection must first create a profile of normal system
behaviour, during which no intrusion takes place. Once the profile has been created, the
IDS compares the current behaviour of the system with the behaviour recorded earlier.
Therefore, there are two distinctive stages in the operation of the IDS: the training stage
and the anomaly detection stage.
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5.5.1 The training stage
Before the IDS can be used to detect intrusions, it must first be "trained", or learn the
normal behaviour of the desired privileged programs. For this purpose, a self-database
is created for each privileged program that should be monitored.
Several methods can be used to create a model of normal privileged behaviour, or a self-
database (Somayaji & Forrest, 2000; Warrender, Forrest & Pearlmutter, 1999). These
include decision trees, neural networks, hidden Markov models, and methods based on
deterministic finite automata.
For the proposed IDS, the method chosen for creating a model of normal privileged
behaviour (i.e. the self-database) is the same as that used by Somayaji and Forrest
(2000). However, the IDS proposed in this dissertation differs significantly from the
intrusion-detection method described by the above authors in that the intrusion-
detection function is placed within mobile agents and not within static components.
The method was chosen within the following constraints. First, the model must be
constructed in one pass over the data; both training and testing must be efficient enough
to be performed in real-time. In other words, the method must be appropriate to use for
on-line training and testing. Secondly, the method must be suitable for large alphabet
sizes. In this case, the alphabet consists of all the different system calls (about 200 for
UNIX systems). Lastly, the method must be able to create models that will be sensitive
to common forms of intrusions.
The system calls made by a process can be obtained by using system call tracers. Such
tools exist on most UNIX platforms, e.g. strace on Linux or truss on Solaris.
These tools can provide a list of the system calls a program makes when it executes.
To create the self-database, a small fixed-size window is slid over the recorded
sequence of system calls and the calls that precede the current call within the sliding
window are recorded. A "pair" is formed by the current call and a call at a fixed
preceding window position. The contents of a window of length x are represented
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by x - 1 pairs. The collection of unique pairs over all the traces for a single program
constitute the model of normal behaviour for that program. A window of size six can be
used in the IDS, which is the standard default used by Somayaji and Forrest (2000).
(Section 6.5.3 discusses how the size of the detector window affects the detection
accuracy of the IDS and why a window of size six is appropriate).
The model of normal behaviour of a program can be formally represented as a 4-tuple
(S, T, w, P) where:
S is the alphabet of possible system calls,
T is the trace; the sequence t 0, t1, ... , tr-1, tr Î S,
w is the window size such that 2 £ w £ r, and
P is the behaviour profile; the set of patterns associated with T and w.
The construction of the normal database is best illustrated with an example. Suppose a
window of size 4 ( w = 4) is used with the following recorded sequence of system calls:
s1, s2, s2, s3, s4, s5, s3, s1, s2, s5
The profile of normal behaviour is constructed by sliding the window across the
sequence. For each call encountered, the calls that precede it at different positions
within the window are recorded and numbered from 0 to w - 1, where 0 is the current
system call. The windows obtained in this trace are shown in Table 5.1.
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Current Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
s1
s2 s1
s2 s2 s1
s3 s2 s2 s1
s4 s3 s2 s2
s5 s4 s3 s2
s3 s5 s4 s3
s1 s3 s5 s4
s2 s1 s3 s5
s5 s2 s1 s3
Table 5.1 Uncompressed table representing normal behaviour
It is likely that a call that occurs more than once in a trace will be preceded by different
calls in different contexts. Therefore, the explicit window representation is compressed
by joining together lines with the same current value. This produces a compressed table
representing normal behaviour, as shown in Table 5.2.
Current Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
s1 s3 s5 s4
s2 s1, s2 s1, s3 s5
s3 s2, s5 s2, s4 s1, s3
s4 s3 s2 s2
s5 s4, s2 s3, s1 s2, s3
Table 5.2 Compressed table representing normal behaviour
This table can be stored in a fixed-size bit array. If | S | is the size of the alphabet
and w is the window size, then the complete model of normal behaviour for a single
program can be stored in a bit array of size | S | ´ | S | ´ (w - 1). For example, the
implementation used by Somayaji and Forrest (2000), where w = 6 is used as the
standard default, uses a 200 ´ 200 byte array, with masks to access the individual bits.
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This shows that a single self-database (i.e. the model of normal behaviour of a single
program) does not require large amounts of storage space. Therefore, the size of a single
self-database should be small enough to make it practical to be placed in a mobile agent.
Once the normal behaviour of a program is known, it can be used to monitor the
behaviour of the program whenever it runs. Monitoring is based on examining the
behaviour (or the generated sequence of system calls) of an executing program and
comparing it with the normal behaviour which has been learnt earlier. This process
occurs during the anomaly detection stage, which is described in the next section.
5.5.2 The anomaly detection stage
During the anomaly detection stage, the normal behaviour of a process is compared
with its current behaviour. Significant deviations from the normal behaviour are
classified as anomalous and as a sign of a possible intrusion.
The following steps describe how an intrusion would be detected by a single mobile
agent during the anomaly detection stage:
1. The mobile agent is created and sent to the network.
2. The mobile agent traverses the network in search for a process to monitor.
3. The mobile agent monitors a privileged process.
4. The mobile agent reports an intrusion to the primary lymphoid host.
The operation of the IDS during the anomaly detection stage is shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Operation of the proposed IDS during the anomaly detection stage
( 1 ) A mobile agent is created by the primary lymphoid host and is sent to the network.
( 2 ) The mobile agent traverses the network, searching for anomalies in the behaviour
of a particular program.
( 3 ) An anomaly has been detected by the mobile agent, which may be a sign of an
intrusion. An intrusion alert is sent to the primary lymphoid host.
( 4 ) The mobile agent continues to monitor other computers ...
( 5 ) ... while the primary lymphoid host responds to the intrusion by taking some
appropriate action (in this case, it notifies the system administrator).
Other hosts in
the network
Lymphoid Host (primary)
"Self" databases
for the various
programs
User
Interface
( 3 )
( 5 )
( 2 ) ( 4 )
( 1 )
Mobile agent platform
Mobile agent
Path of mobile agent as it traverses the network
Computer network
Intrusion alert sent by mobile agent to primary lymphoid host
"Self" database of a privileged program, which stores sequences of
system calls that define the normal behaviour of that program
Legend
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5.5.2.1 Creation of a mobile agent
The configuration of the IDS determines the types and the number of mobile agents that
may be created. The specific privileged programs that should be monitored at any time
determine the types of mobile agents that may be created by a lymphoid host. The
desired rate of intrusion detection (i.e. how quickly an intrusion should be detected)
determines how many mobile agents of each type may be present in the network.
Mobile agents are created by the primary lymphoid host, according to the way in which
the IDS is configured. The primary lymphoid host first creates a generic mobile agent; a
mobile agent that is not yet specialized to monitor a specific privileged program.
Specialization of a mobile agent occurs when the lymphoid host adds the self-database
of a specific program to the agent.
5.5.2.2 Searching for a process to monitor
Once a mobile agent has been created and specialized, it is sent to the network to search
for possible intrusions. The mobile agent moves from host to host by either using a list
of hosts it should visit (provided by the lymphoid host), or by randomly choosing a host
to visit. This choice is an implementation issue (discussed in Section 6.5.7) and does not
affect the rest of the discussion in this section.
All the participating nodes, to which a mobile agent may travel, must have an agent
platform installed. Since many agent systems operate over a wide range of hardware and
software, this requirement is not as difficult to fulfil as it may first appear (i.e. it is
possible for heterogeneous computers to have the same type of agent platform installed)
(Jansen, 2002).
5.5.2.3 Monitoring of a privileged process
Once a mobile agent has reached a desired host, it determines whether the program,
whose normal behaviour it stores, is executing. If the particular program is executing,
then the mobile agent obtains system call sequences made by that program by using the
same process as was used for learning the normal behaviour. As the program is
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executing, the mobile agent compares the system calls made with those stored by the
agent. The comparison process is performed as long as the program is executing. If the
agent finds a significant deviation from the normal behaviour, it reports a possible
intrusion to the lymphoid host. Otherwise, if the comparison does not show a significant
deviation from the normal behaviour and the program has completed its execution, then
the mobile agent searches for another process to monitor. The technique that is used to
compare system calls is the one that has been described in Somayaji and Forrest (2000).
Any system call pair (the current call and a preceding call within the current window)
not present in the normal profile is called a mismatch. Any individual mismatch could
indicate an anomaly in the behaviour of the process (a true positive), or it could be a
sequence that has not been included in the normal profile during the training phase (a
false positive). The current system call is regarded as anomalous if there are any
mismatches within its window.
A fixed-size circular array, called a locality frame, of size n is used to record the number
of the past n system calls that were anomalous. Each element of the locality frame can
store a value of 0 or 1. For the ith system call made by a program, the (i MOD n)th
element of the locality frame is set a value of 0 or 1. A value of 0 indicates that no
mismatch occurred in the current window, while a value of 1 indicates that at least one
mismatch occurred in the current window. That is, each element of the locality frame
does not record the number of mismatches in a window, but whether or not a mismatch
has occurred. (The size of the locality frame is a user-set parameter and is not dependent
on the size of the detector window.)
The sum of the elements of the locality frame is the total number of recent anomalies, or
the number of the past n system calls that were rejected by the definition of normal
behaviour. This value is called the locality frame count (LFC) and provides the anomaly
signal for the IDS.
The value of the locality frame count does not depend upon the absolute trace length.
Therefore, system calls can be monitored as they are made by a process, which allows
this technique to be implemented in an "on-line" IDS. That is, it is not necessary to first
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record the complete list of system calls made during the lifetime of a process before
they are compared.
A user-defined number is selected as a threshold on the LFC value. (The selected
number must be between 1 and the size of the locality frame). The threshold value
controls the allowable deviation from the normal behaviour by indicating how many
system call mismatches are allowed to occur before the mobile agent sends an intrusion
alert. At any time, if the value of the LFC is below this threshold, no intrusions are
reported. However, if the value of the LFC reaches or exceeds this threshold, it may
indicate a possible intrusion and the agent sends an intrusion alert.
To explain the comparison process, the definition of normal behaviour defined in the
previous example (Tables 5.1 and 5.2) will be used.
During the comparison process, the size of the detector window used must be the same
as that which was used for learning the normal behaviour. In this example, the detector
window has size 4.
Assume that, in this example, the size of the locality frame has been set to 10 and that
the value of the threshold on the locality frame count has been set to 5. Therefore, the
locality frame indicates the number of the past 10 system calls that were anomalous and
at least 5 of the past 10 system calls must be anomalous for the mobile agent to report a
possible intrusion. (The values for the size of the locality frame and the threshold for the
locality frame count are user-defined; see Section 6.5.4 on how these values affect the
detection accuracy of the IDS).
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Let the sequence of system calls that is observed during the execution of a program be
as follows (the ellipses indicate that the sequence is not a complete list of system calls
made by the program).
s1, s2, s2, s3, s2, s4, s1, s5, s2, s1, s2, s5, s3, ...
Table 5.3 shows how the values of the elements of the locality frame change as the
above system calls pass through the detector window. Each step is explained below the
table.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 s1 s2 s2 0 - - - - - - - - -
2 s1 s2 s2 s3 0 0 - - - - - - - -
3 s1 s2 s2 s3 s2 0 0 0 - - - - - - -
4 s1 s2 s2 s3 s2 s4 0 0 0 0 - - - - - -
5 s1 s2 s2 s3 s2 s4 s1 0 0 0 0 1 - - - - -
6 s1 s2 s2 s3 s2 s4 s1 s5 0 0 0 0 1 1 - - - -
7 s2 s2 s3 s2 s4 s1 s5 s2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 - - -
8 s2 s3 s2 s4 s1 s5 s2 s1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 - -
9 s3 s2 s4 s1 s5 s2 s1 s2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 -
10 s2 s4 s1 s5 s2 s1 s2 s5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 s4 s1 s5 s2 s1 s2 s5 s3 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 s1 s5 s2 s1 s2 s5 s3 ... 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 s5 s2 s1 s2 s5 s3 ... ... 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 5.3 Example of system call comparison
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Step 1: The current system call is s1 and this is the first system call observed. Therefore
the (1 MOD 10)th element of the locality frame will be used to indicate whether or not
this system call is anomalous. This entry occurs in the defined normal behaviour (first
row of Table 5.1) and therefore is considered as normal. Therefore, element 1 of the
locality frame is assigned a value of 0.
Step 2: The current system call is s2 and this is the second system call observed. The
system call in position 1 is s1. Table 5.1 shows that system call s2 in the current
position and system call s1 in position 1 is part of the normal behaviour of this program.
Therefore, the second ((2 MOD 10)th) element of the locality frame is set to 0,
indicating that no mismatches occurred in this window.
Step 3 - 4: In a similar way, the next two system calls are compared with the normal
behaviour. Elements 1 to 4 of the locality frame have a value of 0. The sum of these
elements, or the locality frame count, is 0. This indicates that no mismatches occurred
so far.
Step 5: The current system call is s2 and this is the fifth system call observed. Table 5.2
shows that the system call in position 1 should be either s1 or s2, but in this case s3
occurs in position 1. Therefore a mismatch has occurred. Mismatches also occur in
positions 2 and 3 of this window. Therefore, the fifth element of the locality frame is set
a value of 1, which indicates that at least one mismatch has occurred in this window.
Step 6: The current system call is s4. Table 5.2 shows that the allowable system call in
position 1 should be s3. However, in this case, system call s2 occurs in position 1.
Therefore a mismatch has occurred. A mismatch also occurs in position 2, where s3
occurs but where only s2 is considered as normal. Therefore, the sixth element of the
locality frame is set a value of 1, indicating that at least one mismatch has occurred in
this window.
Step 7 - 8: In a similar way, the next two system calls are considered as anomalous
because at least one mismatch has occurred in each window. The elements of the
locality frame are updated accordingly. The value of the LFC at the end of step 8 is 4.
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Since the threshold set on this value is 5, the mobile agent still does not report a
possible intrusion.
Step 9: Another system call is considered anomalous because a mismatch has occurred
in this window. The ninth element of the locality frame is set to 1, and now the value of
the LFC is 5. The threshold on the LFC value has been reached and the mobile agent
sends an alert of a possible intrusion.
Step 10: Another system call is considered anomalous because a mismatch has occurred
in this window. The tenth element of the locality frame is set to 1, and now the value of
the LFC is 6. The mobile agent has already sent an intrusion alert in step 9. Whether or
not the mobile agent sends another intrusion alert at this stage is an implementation
issue.
Step 11: Another system call is considered anomalous; this system call is the eleventh
system call observed. Therefore the (11 mod 10 = 1)th element of the locality frame is
set to 1. The value of the LFC is now 7. This indicates that, of the last 10 system calls
observed, 7 are considered not to be part of the normal behaviour of this program.
Step 12: The system call in the current position of the detector window is s5. Table 5.2,
shows that the allowable system calls (or the system calls considered as part of normal
behaviour) are: s4 or s2 in position 1, s3 or s1 in position 2, and s2 or s3 in position 3.
This is exactly the case and therefore there are no mismatches with the twelfth system
call. The second element of the locality frame is set to 0, but the value of the LFC is
still 7.
Step 13: No mismatches occur with the thirteenth observed system call; the value of the
third element of the locality frame is set to 0. The ellipses in the next unexamined
system call indicate that the program has still not completed executing and more system
calls can occur.
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5.5.2.4 Reporting an intrusion to the lymphoid host
When a mobile agent has detected a possible intrusion it sends an intrusion alert to the
primary lymphoid host and continues to monitor the process. When the lymphoid host
receives this message, it will respond by taking an appropriate course of action, as
determined by the way in which the IDS has been configured.
Several possible actions that the IDS can take to respond to an intrusion are listed
below. The list is not complete; a more thorough study of appropriate intrusion response
actions is beyond the scope of this research.
1. Do not respond to the intrusion and let the mobile agent continue to monitor the
process. This action assumes that, if a privileged process has actually been used as a
means of intrusion, then additional anomalous system call sequences will be created.
The mobile agent that monitors this process will be able to notice them and alert the
lymphoid host again. When the lymphoid host receives more than one alert from the
mobile agent, it responds to the intrusion by taking some other action.
2. Alert the system administrator through the user interface provided by the lymphoid
host. This action assumes that the administrator will investigate the intrusion and
take an appropriate action.
3. Increase the rate of intrusion detection for the program type that caused the
intrusion. This is done by allowing the lymphoid host to create additional mobile
agents, whose type is the same as that of the reporting mobile agent. This may also
be done by allowing the reporting agent to create additional copies of itself. This
depends on whether or not the IDS has been configured to allow the mobile agents
this capability. This action assumes that, if an intrusion has occurred through a
particular program running on a particular host, then additional intrusions may occur
(or have occurred) at other hosts on which this particular program runs. The number
of agents that can be created in such situations should be set by the user before the
operation of the IDS.
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4. Increase the number of types of privileged programs that can be monitored. This is
done by allowing the lymphoid host to create additional types of mobile agents that
are present in the network. This action assumes that, if an intrusion has occurred
through a particular type of privileged process, then additional intrusions may occur
(or have occurred) at hosts with other types of privileged processes. The number and
types of agents created in this case should be set by the user before the operation of
the IDS.
5.6 Immune system concepts applied in the IDS
In Section 4.3, properties of the immune system that make the system fault-tolerant and
enable it to effectively detect intrusions were presented. By applying concepts of the
immune system to an IDS based on mobile agents, an IDS resulted that also possesses
those same properties. The same properties that offered fault-tolerance to the immune
system have also contributed to the fault-tolerance of the IDS.
1. Distributability. As in the immune system, there is no central controller in the IDS.
Intrusion detection is distributed because this function resides within mobile agents
that travel from host to host in the network.
2. Diversity. A separate database of normal behaviour for each desired program is
created. The database is specific to a particular architecture, software version and
configuration, local administrative policies as well as usage patterns. Since there is a
large variability in how individual systems are currently configured and used, the
individual databases will provide a unique definition of self for most systems
(Forrest et al., 1996).
3. Disposability. Any mobile agent of the IDS can be replaced by creating a new one.
Therefore, no single mobile agent is essential to detect intrusions.
4. Autonomy. Once a mobile agent has been created, it is not directly controlled by
some other entity. For example, the agent itself decides when to migrate from one
host to another, without being directly controlled by its home platform.
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5. Adaptability. The system can adapt to detect new types of intrusions because any
new behaviour of a program (i.e. behaviour that has not been recorded in the self-
database of that program) will be regarded as intrusive. At the same time, previously
seen intrusions will also be recognized because they too have not been recorded as
part of the normal behaviour of that particular program.
6. Anomaly detection. The IDS uses anomaly detection because it is based on
identifying deviations in a program's normal behaviour rather than on searching for
known attack methods.
7. Dynamically changing coverage. In order not to overburden the computer system,
not all hosts with an installed agent platform are monitored at the same time. Only
those hosts that have a mobile agent running on an agent platform are monitored.
Even when a mobile agent is monitoring a particular host, only the program type for
which the mobile agent is specialized is being monitored. In addition, the types of
programs that are monitored can be changed by changing the types of agents that are
present in the network. Therefore, the coverage of programs that are monitored
changes dynamically.
8. Identity via behaviour. The IDS identifies processes via their behaviour. "Self"
processes are identified by the system call sequences that are stored in the self-
database of that program. Intrusive, or "non-self", processes are identified by the
lack of the generated system call sequences in the self-database of that program.
9. Imperfect detection. The IDS creates an intrusion alert whenever the behaviour of a
process significantly deviates from the behaviour that has been recorded in the self-
database of that program. Therefore, detection is imperfect because it is not known
whether the behaviour deviation is a sign of an actual intrusion or a false alarm.
In conclusion, we can see that the use of mobile agents in the proposed IDS is
analogous to the use of white blood cells in the human immune system. Mobile agents
and white blood cells have several similarities (largely based on Foukia, Hulaas and
Harms (2001)). Firstly, both mobile agents and white blood cells are autonomous. That
is, once they have been created, they are not directly controlled by other entities (i.e.
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other organs in the case of white blood cells or other computers in the case of mobile
agents). Secondly, both continuously circulate through their domain: white blood cells
continually move through the body in the blood, while mobile agents continually move
from computer to computer through the network. Thirdly, both are specialized in
detecting a particular intrusion. Each white blood cell is specialized to detect only a
particular type of antigen (e.g. a specific kind of bacteria) and will not react to another
kind of antigen. Similarly, mobile agents of the proposed IDS are specialized to detect
anomalies in the behaviour of only a particular type of privileged program.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter presented an IDS that is based on some of the main properties of the
human immune system and which uses mobile agents to detect intrusions. The chapter
discussed the main components of the IDS and how the IDS should function if it were
implemented.
In the next chapter, the proposed IDS is theoretically evaluated by discussing how it
satisfies the objective of this research, as well as the system's benefits and drawbacks.
Some of the most significant issues that will need to be considered when implementing
the proposed IDS are also discussed.
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  CHAPTER 6 
T HEORETICAL E VALUATION
OF THE PROPOSED INTRUSION
DETECTION SYSTEM
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, an IDS that is based on the human immune system and which
uses mobile agents to detect intrusions was proposed. In this chapter, the proposed IDS
is theoretically evaluated by discussing how it satisfies the objective of this research,
that is, how the IDS offers greater robustness and fault-tolerance than the present-day
commercial IDSs based on hierarchical architectures. The benefits and the drawbacks of
the proposed IDS are also discussed. This is followed by a discussion of some of the
most significant issues that will need to be considered when implementing the IDS. This
chapter is concluded in Section 6.6.
6.2 How does the proposed IDS solve the research  problem?
The research problem, or the aim of the research, is to propose an IDS architecture that
offers greater robustness and fault-tolerance than the current hierarchical architectures,
which are used by nearly all present-day commercial IDSs. Therefore, to answer the
question of how does the proposed IDS solve the research problem, we need to discuss
how the proposed IDS provides greater robustness and fault-tolerance than an IDS
based on a hierarchical architecture.
The main problem with a hierarchical IDS architecture (as discussed in Section 2.5.2) is
that its tree structure introduces many single points of failure. This makes the system
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vulnerable to direct attack because failure of such critical components (e.g. as a result of
an attack on the IDS) may result in failure of the entire IDS. In addition, because such
components are static in a network, they can be found relatively easily by a determined
and knowledgeable attacker (when compared with the more difficult task of finding
non-static components in a network). Once found, the components can be disabled by
the attacker.
It is probably impossible to design an IDS that will be completely resistant to direct
attack. However, an IDS can be designed such that it will be more robust and fault-
tolerant and thereby more difficult to disable completely. By improving the robustness
of the IDS, we reduce its vulnerability to direct attack. By increasing the fault-tolerance
of the system, we provide it with the ability to tolerate failures of its key components.
That is, the system can continue to function and detect intrusions even after most of its
key components have been successfully attacked and disabled.
Our approach to improve the fault-tolerance of the IDS and to reduce the system's
vulnerability to direct attack is to:
1. Eliminate single points of failure in the IDS. That is, there should be no component
in the system that is essential to the system's function; every component should be
replaceable. Such a system will be able to detect intrusions (although at a reduced
efficiency) even when many of its components have failed. Therefore, the system
will provide fault-tolerance.
2. Make the critical components of the IDS non-static. That is, the critical components
of the IDS (i.e. the components that perform the actual function of intrusion
detection) should be able to move from host to host in the network. This will make it
more difficult for an attacker to know the exact location of each component at any
time. In addition, it will be beneficial if these critical components were to have the
ability to replicate. This will provide the IDS the ability to vary the number of the
intrusion detection components. The implication of this is that an attacker would
find it much more difficult to know the exact locations and the number of the critical
components of the IDS. Therefore, the IDS will be less vulnerable to a direct attack
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on its critical components, because they will be more difficult to locate than static
components.
The rest of this section discusses how the above approach has been implemented and
consequently improved the fault-tolerance and robustness of the IDS.
6.2.1 Elimination of single points of failure
The architecture of the proposed IDS has no aggregation nodes. There is also no root
node that is responsible for the actual function of detecting intrusions. Instead, the
function of intrusion detection is divided and placed within mobile agents, which travel
from host to host in the network. Since the collection of mobile agents in the system
provides the intrusion-detection function, the mobile agents are considered to be the
critical components of the IDS (i.e. critical for the intrusion-detection function).
As explained in Section 4.2, the organs of the adaptive immune system (lymphoid
organs) are positioned throughout the body and store white blood cells. Using the
immune system analogy, the proposed IDS has two main types of components:
lymphoid hosts and mobile agents. The lymphoid hosts play the role of the lymphoid
organs, and the mobile agents play the role of the white blood cells. The lymphoid hosts
are responsible for creating the mobile agents that detect intrusions. For this purpose,
each lymphoid host requires a copy of the databases that define "self", or normal
program behaviour. Therefore, copies of these databases are distributed throughout the
network and are stored in every lymphoid host.
None of the main components of the IDS introduce a single point of failure. That is, the
IDS can continue to function even when most of its components have been attacked or
have failed.
When an intruder successfully attacks a lymphoid host (or otherwise makes the host
unreachable), the mobile agents created by that host are still be able to function and
carry out their task of intrusion detection. That is, a mobile agent does not rely on the
presence of its lymphoid host to detect intrusions. This is possible because, once a
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mobile agent has been created, it does not need to communicate with its home platform.
(Once a mobile agent has been created, its only need for a lymphoid host is to send it
reports of detected intrusions. However, it is also possible to report intrusions to some
other host in the network.)  When a lymphoid host is disabled, the backup lymphoid
host takes over. This implies that the mobile agents in the network can report intrusions
to a lymphoid host even if their home platform has been disabled. Even if all the
lymphoid hosts have been successfully disabled, the mobile agents that remain in the
network survive and can still detect intrusions and multiply, while intrusions can be
reported to some other host at which the system administrator can be alerted.
It is also possible to increase the number of mobile agents in the IDS even if all the
lymphoid hosts have been successfully disabled. This is possible through agent
replication; an agent can replicate on any host where the agent platform is installed,
without the assistance of its home platform. Therefore, the lymphoid hosts are not
considered as single points of failure because intrusions can be detected by mobile
agents even if all the lymphoid hosts have failed.
Mobile agents also do not introduce a single point of failure. As in the immune system,
the individual intrusion detectors of the IDS (i.e. the mobile agents) are disposable. Any
mobile agent of the IDS can be replaced by creating a new one. New mobile agents can
be created either by a lymphoid host or through agent replication. Therefore, even if an
attacker disables many mobile agents, intrusions can still be detected because new
mobile agents can be quickly created by the system. Therefore, no single mobile agent
is essential to detect intrusions.
Therefore, there are no single points of failure in the proposed IDS because no single
component is essential for the system to detect intrusions. That is, the system can
continue to function even when most of its components have failed; the IDS is fault-
tolerant.
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6.2.2 Making the critical components of the IDS non-static
The proposed IDS uses mobile agents to detect intrusions. Mobile agents, by definition,
have the ability to migrate from one host to another in the network. Mobility of these
critical components makes it more difficult for an attacker to disable them, thereby
reducing the system's vulnerability to direct attack.
For the operation of the whole IDS to be disabled, an attacker would need to
successfully disable all the lymphoid hosts and all the mobile agents in the network.
When all the mobile agents and all the lymphoid hosts have been disabled, the IDS
cannot detect intrusions and no new agents can be created either by the lymphoid hosts
themselves or through agent replication.
The lymphoid hosts are static and therefore can be found and disabled by a determined
and knowledgeable attacker. However, the mobile agents already in the network are
more difficult to disable. To disable the mobile agents, the intruder would first need to
find them, but since they are not static and their number can vary, this task is more
difficult than for static components (such as the lymphoid hosts). The intruder could
also try to attack the agent platforms themselves in an attempt to destroy the mobile
agents. However, as every host that we wish to monitor will have an agent platform
installed, this task is not trivial if there are many hosts.
Therefore, the proposed IDS is less vulnerable to direct attack. This results from the fact
that the critical components of the IDS are more difficult to find and consequently are
more difficult to disable than in a hierarchical IDS architecture.
6.3 Benefits of the proposed IDS
The proposed IDS offers a number of useful advantages for intrusion detection systems
over an IDS based on a hierarchical architecture that uses only static components. In
this section, the most significant advantages are discussed; this list is not necessarily
exhaustive.
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6.3.1 Greater robustness and fault-tolerance
The main benefit of the proposed system is that it offers greater robustness and fault-
tolerance than hierarchical IDS architectures. The system has no single point of failure
and can continue to operate even when most of its components have failed. This
advantage has been described in detail in Section 6.2.
6.3.2 Reduction in network traffic
In a hierarchical IDS architecture, the nodes at the bottom of the hierarchy collect event
data. This data is then passed to higher internal nodes until it reaches the root node. The
internal nodes perform data aggregation, abstraction, and reduction. The root node is
responsible, inter alia, for the actual function of determining whether an intrusion has
occurred. The need to move large volumes of data among the nodes of the IDS produces
a large amount of network traffic, especially if there are many nodes that comprise the
architecture of the IDS.
The proposed IDS uses mobile agents for intrusion detection. The mobile agents move
to the hosts at which event data is collected and process the data locally at that host.
Therefore, there is no need to move the event data across the network. In other words,
the computation is moved to the data, rather than moving the data to the computation.
Although the movement of mobile agents will, of course, create network traffic, the
amount of traffic generated will be lower (provided that the amount of event data
collected at a host is larger than the size of a mobile agent that is assigned to process the
data).
6.3.3 Dynamic adaptation
The proposed IDS can adapt its monitoring strategy. That is, if there is a low risk of an
intrusion, then there may be a relatively small number of active mobile agents in the
network. In such situations, the IDS imposes a small overhead on the computer system
because there is a small number of active intrusion detectors (mobile agents) in the
network. When the risk of an intrusion is greater, for example when intrusions have
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occurred recently or when an intrusion is occurring, then the number of active mobile
agents in the network can be increased. This will improve the intrusion detection rate
(i.e. how quickly intrusions can be detected) because there are more intrusion detectors
that search for intrusions in the network. Although the overhead imposed on the IDS
during such situations is greater, it is a small cost to pay for the ability to quickly detect
intrusions.
Therefore, the advantage of the ability to adapt to both favourable and unfavourable
situations is that the overhead imposed on the computer system by the IDS can be
adjusted according to the perceived intrusion risk.
6.3.4 Ability to detect attacks that a network-based IDS will miss
A network-based IDS can only analyse network traffic; it is unable to monitor the
behaviour of executing programs. The proposed IDS can monitor the execution of
specific privileged programs to determine whether some of their vulnerabilities have
been exploited. Therefore, the proposed IDS can detect intrusions that a network-based
IDS cannot.
6.3.5 Ability to detect unknown attacks
The proposed IDS is based on anomaly detection, which allows it to detect new types of
attacks that have not been seen before. Therefore, unlike IDSs based on misuse
detection, it does not need to be updated with new attack signatures when new attacks
are devised.
6.3.6 Scalability
In the hierarchical IDS architecture described in Section 2.5.2, the root node performs
the actual function of determining whether an intrusion has occurred. As more
computers are added to computer networks, the computational load of the root node
increases because it must process greater volumes of information.
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To provide scalability in the proposed IDS, the total computational load of the
intrusion-detection function is not placed on any single component of the IDS, but is
distributed by using mobile agents. Each mobile agent monitors hosts locally, without
the need for a central controller (i.e. there is no central controller that detects
intrusions).
6.4 Drawbacks of the proposed IDS
Although the proposed IDS provides greater robustness and fault-tolerance, it is by no
means perfect. Below, several weaknesses of the IDS are discused; the list is not
necessarily exhaustive.
6.4.1 Inability to detect some types of intrusions
In the proposed IDS, sequences of system calls of executing privileged programs have
been chosen as that on which monitoring is done. By making this choice, monitoring of
the IDS is restricted to processes only. Therefore, there are several classes of intrusions
that will not be detected:
- Because the IDS is host-based, it cannot detect attacks that are detectable by using a
network-based IDS. For example, the TearDrop attack, which involves sending
fragmented IP packets that overlap (CERT, 1997) cannot be detected by the IDS
because this attack is only detectable by analysing network traffic.
- Attacks involving a race condition will not be detected (Forrest et al., 1996). These
types of intrusions typically involve stealing a resource (such as a file) created by a
program running with root / supervisor access, before the program has had a chance
to restrict access to the resource. If the root process does not detect an unusual error,
then a normal set of system calls will be made, which will not be regarded as an
intrusion.
- Another type of intrusion that will not be detected is the case of an intruder using
another user's account (Forrest et al., 1996). The IDS does not make use of user
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profiles (which store a record of a user's normal behaviour) and therefore this class
of intrusions is not likely to be detectable.
6.4.2 Dependency on the host operating system
The proposed IDS monitors the behaviour of privileged programs by comparing the
system calls generated during their execution with those observed during the training
phase. Because system calls are used as the basis of detecting intrusions, the intrusion-
detection function is dependent on a specific set of system call names. This set of
system call names is dependent on a specific operating system. Therefore, the IDS is
dependent on a specific operating system used by the monitored hosts. Therefore, the
IDS can be used to monitor only those hosts that are using the operating system(s) that
were selected during the training phase (unlike a network-based IDS that is operating-
system-independent).
6.4.3 Agent platforms
An agent platform must be installed on every host that should be monitored by mobile
agents. Since many agent systems operate over a wide range of hardware and software,
this requirement is not as difficult to fulfil as it may first appear. However, it may
increase the cost of ownership of the IDS, when compared with a network-based IDS
(which requires fewer data collection components).
6.4.4 Mobile agent security issues
Different categories of security threats related to the use of mobile agents have been
discussed in Section 3.10. It is important to ensure that the use of mobile agents does
not introduce vulnerabilities in the IDS. Therefore, before the system is implemented, it
should be determined what countermeasures should be used to resolve or reduce the
different threats.
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6.5 Issues that should be considered when implementing the
proposed IDS
There are many issues that need to be taken into account when implementing the
proposed IDS. This section discusses the most significant issues that should be
considered.
6.5.1 Dynamically changing coverage
The intrusion-detection function is implemented in mobile agents, with each mobile
agent specialized to monitor only a specific type of program. The execution of a
particular program on a host is monitored only when a mobile agent specific to that
program is located on that host.
The implication of this is that a host on which a privileged program executes is
vulnerable if there is no agent monitoring the execution of that privileged program. If
the proper agent is not present on the host when a privileged program executes, any
abnormal behaviour of that program will not be noticed. Therefore, even though the IDS
can detect anomalies in privileged programs, it is possible that an intrusion will be
unnoticed if there is no agent to detect it on the host when the attack occurs.
To ensure that a host is not left vulnerable whenever a privileged process executes, there
should be a mobile agent, which is specialized in detecting intrusions in that specific
program, located at the host. Increasing the number of mobile agents of each type
decreases the likelihood of an undetected intrusion resulting from a lack of the
appropriate agent to detect the intrusion as it occurs. However, increasing the number of
mobile agents present in the network also increases the computational load on the
computer system. It also increases the amount of network traffic generated by migration
of agents. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the ability to detect all intrusions and
the overhead placed on the computer system by the IDS.
One way to reduce the possibility of not detecting an intrusion is to record the system
calls made by a privileged process in a log. This log is created on the host as the
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privileged program executes. When the appropriate mobile agent arrives at the host, it
searches for possible intrusions by comparing the system calls stored in the log with the
system calls stored by the agent. The benefit of this approach is that all intrusions that
can be detected by the IDS will be detected. However, this approach does not perform
"on-line" intrusion detection because there can be a long time period between an
intrusion and its detection. Therefore, the drawback of this approach is that it does not
allow intrusions to be detected as soon as they occur, in time to respond to the intrusion
while the attack is still occurring. In addition, during the time between the occurrence of
an intrusion and its detection by a mobile agent, the intruder may already have gained
sufficient privileges in the host to modify the log and erase any signs of an intrusion.
Therefore, before the system is implemented, it should be considered whether it will be
acceptable to allow some hosts to be vulnerable or whether the IDS should use logs,
which would allow the IDS to detect all intrusions, even if it would not detect them as
soon as they occur.
Another way to address this problem is to modify the kernel of the operating system
such that, whenever a privileged program starts executing, the operating system sends a
request to the primary lymphoid host to send an appropriate mobile agent to monitor the
execution of the privileged program. Although this approach will ensure that the proper
agent is always present on a host when a privileged program executes, it also requires
that the operating system know which host in the network acts as the primary lymphoid
host.
6.5.2 Mobile agent language
The language that will be used to implement the mobile agents must be selected not
only with regard to its capabilities, but also with regard to its implications on the IDS.
For example, Java-based mobile agents typically load their class files dynamically, as
needed, from their home platform (Jansen et al., 1999). If the home platform is
unavailable (i.e. the lymphoid host has failed), these class files must be provided by the
local host, or they must be found and transferred from some other remote host.
Therefore, such mobile agents are not completely independent of their home platforms.
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In addition, class loading from a remote platform or the local host platform also raises
several security concerns. For example, the class files may have been modified, which
can alter the functionality of the agent.
Moreover, the runtime environments for mobile agents often slow down an IDS based
on mobile agents. This is especially apparent if mobile agents are implemented in slow
interpreted languages.
6.5.3 Detector window size
During both the training stage and the anomaly detection stage, a detector window of a
fixed size is used to obtain sequences of system calls. Before we discuss how the size of
the detector window affects the detection accuracy of the IDS, let us define the terms
foreign sequence and minimal foreign sequence.
A foreign sequence is a (Tan & Maxion, 2002) "... foreign order of symbols, i.e. a
sequence in which each individual symbol within the sequence is a member of the
training set alphabet, but where the order of the symbols is one that does not exist in the
set of sequences obtained from the training-set ... ".  In other words, it is a sequence that
does not occur in the trace(s) used to define normal behaviour. A minimal foreign
sequence is a foreign sequence that does not contain smaller foreign sequences.
A foreign sequence is only visible if the size of the detector window is at least as large
as the size of the foreign sequence (Tan & Maxion, 2002). Therefore, the size of the
detector window must not be smaller than the size of the minimal foreign sequence.
This stems from the fact that the minimum size of the detector window required to
detect each minimal foreign sequence is equal to the size of the minimal foreign
sequence itself.
Somayaji and Forrest (2000) used a default detector size of length six. This is because
the length of the smallest minimal foreign sequence present in their test data was six,
which is the minimal foreign sequence length in this case.
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The proposed IDS will not detect anomalies when the size of the foreign sequence
anomaly is greater than the size of a foreign sequence detectable by the IDS (i.e. the size
of the detector window). Therefore, the size of the detector window affects the detection
accuracy of the IDS. To select an appropriate detector window size, the size of the
minimal foreign sequence should be determined for the particular environment in which
the IDS will be used.
6.5.4 Locality frame count
In the proposed IDS, a fixed-size circular array, called a locality frame, is used to record
the current anomalous system calls. A locality frame of size n stores the number of the
past n system calls that were anomalous. This number, called the locality frame count
(LFC), is the total number of recent anomalies (mismatches) and provides the anomaly
signal for the IDS. (The size of the locality frame is a user-set parameter and is not
dependent of the size of the detector window.)
In the proposed IDS, a number must be chosen as a threshold on the LFC value, below
which traces are still considered as normal. (This number must be between 1 and the
size of the locality frame.) The threshold value controls the allowable deviation from the
normal behaviour by indicating how many system call mismatches are allowed to occur
before an intrusion alert is raised. If, at any time, the LFC value is equal to or greater
than the chosen threshold, an anomaly is recorded.
The selection of the threshold number affects the detection accuracy of the proposed
IDS. When a low threshold value is used, anomalies (intrusions) are recorded more
often, but also with a greater number of false positives. That is, a small number of
mismatches are needed for the IDS to record an intrusion. On the other hand, when a
high threshold value is used, the number of false positives decreases, but so does the
number of recorded anomalies. That is, many mismatches need to occur before the IDS
will record an intrusion. Therefore, proper selection of a threshold value on the LFC
plays an important role in the operation of the IDS. To select an appropriate threshold
value on the LFC, it should be determined what the acceptable number of false positives
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is in the particular environment in which the IDS will be used (bearing in mind that the
threshold value also affects the number of true positives recorded).
6.5.5 Control of the IDS
In a hierarchical IDS architecture, the root node not only performs the actual function of
intrusion detection, but it also usually reports to an operator console at which an
administrator can manually assess status and issue commands to the IDS.
In the proposed IDS, there is no root node. As described in Section 5.5.2, when a mobile
agent detects an intrusion, it alerts a lymphoid host. For this reason, the lymphoid host
provides the user interface through which the system administrator can learn of
intrusions, issue commands and configure the IDS.
However, when all lymphoid hosts have been disabled, mobile agents can still detect
intrusions, but they will not be able to report intrusions to a lymphoid host. In such
situations, the system administrator will not be able to learn of intrusions through a
lymphoid host. Therefore, before the IDS is implemented, a choice must be made as to
which computer a mobile agent must report intrusions when all lymphoid hosts have
been disabled. This will allow the system administrator to know when an intrusion has
occurred, even when all the lymphoid hosts have been disabled.
6.5.6 Intrusions during the learning stage
The operation of the proposed IDS is based on several assumptions (see Section 5.5).
One assumption is that no intrusions occur during the time when the normal behaviour
of a program is recorded (i.e. during the learning stage). If an intrusion occurs while the
normal behaviour of a program is recorded, then that particular intrusion will be
regarded as part of the normal behaviour of that program. Therefore, that particular
intrusion will not be noticed when the IDS will be monitoring the behaviour of that
program. Therefore, before the IDS is used, ways in which to ensure that no intrusions
occur during the learning stage need to be examined. For example, the environment
could be carefully monitored during the learning stage to ensure that no intrusions
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occur, or the learning stage could occur in an secure, isolated environment, where it
certain that no intrusions will occur.
6.5.7 Selection of monitored hosts
In the proposed IDS, mobile agents move from one host to another to detect intrusions.
The exact way in which a mobile agent selects a host to which it will migrate is left to
the implementation of the system.
One possible way in which to select hosts is to provide the mobile agent with a list of
hosts that it must monitor. This list can be provided by the entity that created the mobile
agent (e.g. the lymphoid host). The mobile agent then monitors the listed hosts, one
after the other. The implication of this choice is that the creating entity must know what
hosts should be monitored. Therefore, when hosts are added or removed from the
network, the creating entity must be notified of such changes.
A different strategy is to allow the mobile agents to choose hosts by themselves. The
mobile agent can choose a host randomly and migrate to that host. Once the mobile
agent finished monitoring that host, it chooses another host at random and migrates to it.
Therefore, a mobile agent is free to monitor any host it chooses. However, in this
strategy, there is no control over which hosts will be monitored. This may lead to
undesirable situations where some host is monitored more often than needed, while
another host is not monitored enough.
Other strategies can also be considered. The benefits and drawbacks of different
strategies need to be considered before an appropriate strategy is chosen.
6.5.8 Agent destruction
Agent destruction is necessary to allow the IDS to control the number and the types of
mobile agents that are active in the network at any time. However, a vulnerability is
introduced in the IDS by providing a component of the IDS the ability to destroy the
intrusion detectors (mobile agents). That is, an attacker can modify this component in
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such a way that it will issue commands to destroy mobile agents, thereby disabling the
intrusion-detection function of the IDS.
Below is a suggested approach to agent destruction. This approach is based on
providing each mobile agent with a limited lifetime, thereby ensuring that a mobile
agent will not be active indefinitely. This is similar to the immune system, where each
white blood cell also has a limited lifetime.
Initial approach to agent destruction
When a mobile agent is created, it is given a certain amount of "energy". This can refer
to the number of hosts the agent can visit, or the amount of resources (e.g. CPU time) it
can consume. As the agent traverses the network and monitors processes, it decrements
its energy by a certain amount. When the energy of the agent reaches zero, the agent
requests additional energy from the primary lymphoid host. Upon receiving this request,
the primary lymphoid host decides if the agent should remain active or if the agent
should be terminated. If the agent is to remain active, the primary lymphoid host
responds by sending a message that allows the agent to increase its energy level by a
certain amount. On the other hand, if the agent is no longer needed, then the primary
lymphoid host notifies the agent that it will not receive additional energy. In this case,
the agent will be terminated on its current agent platform.
In situations where all the lymphoid hosts have been attacked and disabled, the mobile
agents would not be able to request additional energy. However, when all the lymphoid
hosts have been attacked and disabled, the mobile agents in the network should continue
with their task to ensure that the intrusion-detection function is not disabled when the
static components of the IDS have been successfully attacked. Therefore, whenever a
mobile agent cannot contact any lymphoid host with a request for additional energy, the
agent assumes that all lymphoid hosts have been disabled. In such situations, the agent
ignores the fact that it has no more energy and continues to function.
The described approach to agent destruction has a significant flaw. The flaw is the
ability of a lymphoid host to notify a mobile agent that it will not receive additional
energy, causing the agent to be destroyed at its current platform. An attacker can exploit
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this fact by successfully attacking and modifying the lymphoid hosts in such a way that
they will always notify agents that they will not receive additional energy. This can
eventually lead to a situation where all active agents are destroyed and no guarantee is
given that new agents will be created by the lymphoid hosts (since they are under the
attacker's control). Therefore, an attacker will be able to disable the IDS without the
need to find and destroy the mobile agents.
Modification of the initial approach to mitigate the described vulnerability
To eliminate a static component that provides additional energy to mobile agents, the
IDS can have several mobile agents whose only purpose is to serve as energy-providers
to the other mobile agents. This approach will make it more difficult for an attacker to
disable mobile agents through the modification of the energy-providing component of
the IDS because this component is mobile. Mobility makes this component more
difficult to find by the attacker. Therefore, the vulnerability that the energy-providing
component will be modified is reduced by reducing the possibility that this component
can be found. However, this vulnerability is not eliminated because the energy-
providing mobile agents are not immune to modification by an attacker.
Mobility also makes the energy-providing component more difficult to find by the other
mobile agents in the network when they request energy. Either the energy-providing
mobile agents need to be aware of the locations of the intrusion-detection agents in the
network, or the intrusion-detection agents need to be aware of the location of the
energy-providing component. Either way introduces additional overhead and
complexity in the system.
Why is this aspect of the IDS considered as an implementation issue?
This aspect of the proposed IDS is probably best left to a specific implementation. The
reason for this choice is that this vulnerability cannot be avoided. That is, although it is
necessary to provide the IDS with the functionality of agent destruction (to control the
number and the types of agents), no guarantee can be given that an attacker will not
exploit this function. When this aspect is left to a specific implementation, it allows the
implementer to address this vulnerability in a way that satisfies the needs of the
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implementation. For example, when using the above approach, it is much more difficult
to modify a lymphoid host rather than to disable it. Therefore, if the implementation
requires that the IDS impose as little overhead as possible, then only the initial approach
will be sufficient, at the risk that an attacker can modify the lymphoid hosts to disable
the mobile agents. On the other hand, if modification of the lymphoid hosts is
considered to pose a great risk to the IDS, then the implementer might choose to
implement the modified approach, or choose to implement an entirely different
approach.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the proposed IDS has been theoretically evaluated by discussing how it
satisfies the objective of this research. The proposed IDS solved the research problem
by eliminating single points of failure in the IDS, and also by making critical
components of the IDS non-static. The possible benefits and drawbacks of the proposed
IDS have also been discussed. This chapter also considered some of the system's
unsolved aspects as well as the most significant issues that will need to be considered
when implementing the IDS.
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  CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this dissertation was to discuss how mobile agent technology can be
applied in an IDS, and consequently increase the IDS's fault-tolerance. The human
immune system was used as a model for the IDS. Such an IDS was proposed and
theoretically described in terms of its main components and how the system functions.
The resulting similarities between the human immune system and the proposed IDS
have also been discussed.
Only certain properties of the human immune system have been applied in the proposed
IDS. Many properties that are of importance to the human immune system have not
been applied. That is, some aspects of the immune system, such as the various genetic
controls used in the immune system, are not appropriate for an IDS. Other aspects of the
immune system, such as random generation of receptors and negative selection, would
unnecessarily complicate the proposed IDS. For example, random generation of
receptors would require that the mobile agents be given a random sequence of system
calls to search for (as opposed to be given a self-database and the ability to determine if
the system call sequences are part of the self-database or not). Through the process of
negative-selection, those mobile agents that have a sequence of system calls that is
considered as part of the normal behaviour of a program, would be eliminated. Those
agents that would not be eliminated, would be released and would search for their
specific sequence of system calls. The number of possible sequences of system calls
that are not part of the normal behaviour of a program far exceeds the number of those
sequences that are part of the normal behaviour of a program. Therefore, such an IDS
would need to create and manage a larger number of mobile agents than the proposed
IDS. (This assumption would still be true even if each mobile agent would carry several
sequences of system calls that are not considered as part of the normal behaviour of a
program.)
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First, background information to the solution was provided. This included Chapters 2, 3,
and 4, where intrusion detection systems, mobile agents, and the human immune system
were discussed, respectively. Chapter 2 also described why an IDS based on a
hierarchical architecture has many single points of failure and is thereby not considered
fault-tolerant (see Section 2.5.2). In Chapter 5, an IDS was proposed to solve the
research problem, which was to propose an IDS architecture that offers greater
robustness and fault-tolerance than the current hierarchical architectures used by nearly
all present-day commercial IDSs. The proposed IDS was theoretically described in
terms of its main components and how it should function if it were implemented.
Thereafter, the proposed IDS was theoretically evaluated in Chapter 6.
The proposed IDS solved the research problem by eliminating single points of failure in
the IDS, and also by making the critical components of the IDS non-static. By designing
the IDS in such a way that there exists no single component that is essential for the
system to detect intrusions, the system can continue to detect intrusions even when most
of its components have been attacked or have failed; the IDS is fault-tolerant. By
making the critical components of the IDS non-static, the IDS is less vulnerable to
direct attack because its components are more difficult to find and consequently are
more difficult to disable than in a hierarchical IDS architecture that only makes use of
static components.
There are also several unsolved aspects of the IDS, which have been discussed in
Section 6.5 together with other significant issues that will need to be considered when
implementing the IDS. For example, there is still no optimal solution to ensuring that an
attacker will not exploit the function of agent destruction, which is necessary to control
the number and types of mobile agents present in the network (see Section 6.5.7).
7.1 Recommendations for further research
Although the proposed IDS provides greater fault-tolerance, the solution also has
several drawbacks. The system also has several unsolved aspects, which were beyond
the scope of this dissertation. Further research is certainly needed to eliminate or
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minimize the effects of the mentioned drawbacks and also to provide satisfactory
solutions to the unsolved aspects of the system.
In the proposed IDS, potential intrusions are detected by comparing sequences of
system calls generated by an executing privileged program with those sequences that are
considered as part of the normal behaviour of that program. This limits the types of
intrusions that the IDS can detect (see Section 6.4.1). Therefore, a possible area of
future research is to improve the intrusion-detection capability of the proposed IDS.
This can be done by increasing the number of intrusion-detection methods supported by
the IDS. A variety of new types of mobile agents can be proposed, which use different
techniques to detect intrusions.
For example, the proposed IDS cannot detect intruders that use another user's account,
because the IDS cannot distinguish between different users. To provide this ability in
the IDS, new types of mobile agents could be proposed, which would be able to
distinguish between normal and abnormal user behaviour. This would also require that
the normal, or expected, behaviour of users be defined by collecting data relating to the
behaviour of legitimate users over a period of time. The mobile agents can then apply
statistical tests to the observed behaviour to determine the legitimacy of the user
behaviour.
A natural progression from this work would be to improve the proposed IDS by
providing it with an intrusion-response function. As in the immune system, such an IDS
would not only be capable of detecting intrusions, but would also be able to combat
them.
Providing an intrusion-response function in the IDS would require a study to determine
the types of intrusions that the proposed IDS can detect, as well as a study of the
existing techniques or mechanisms that are appropriate for combating each type of
intrusion detectable by the IDS. Thereafter, an appropriate mechanism, which is to
provide the intrusion-response capability in the IDS, would need to be proposed.
The intrusion-response function could be implemented in mobile agents that would be
specialized to respond to specific intrusions. When an intrusion-detection mobile agent
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would detect a potential intrusion, it would activate the appropriate intrusion-response
mobile agent. The intrusion-response mobile agent would then take the necessary action
to respond to the intrusion. By having separate intrusion-detection and intrusion-
response mobile agents, the size of individual mobile agents would be small enough to
make it practical for them to be transported in the network.
The intrusion-response function could also be implemented in the same agents that
detect intrusions. However, this approach would create greater amounts of network
traffic because, by combining a specific intrusion-detection function and the related
intrusion-response function into a single mobile agent, the size of the mobile agent
would be increased. In addition, it is not necessary that the intrusion-response function
be transported together with the intrusion-detection function, because the intrusion-
response function is only needed when an intrusion has been detected. That is, the
intrusion-response function should be transported only when it is required, so as to
minimize the amount of network traffic generated by the IDS.
In conclusion, this dissertation has shown that, by studying the human immune system
and by applying its properties to intrusion detection, an improved IDS has resulted. This
suggests that, even though there are many differences between living organisms and
computer systems, the similarities could indeed point the way to improved computer
security and computer systems in general.
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